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As the right to privacy continues its expansive development in
the legislaturesand the courts, decision-makers are becoming more
aware of the importance and difficulty of balancing an individual's right to privacy against the needs of society. ProfessorAdants here examines the right to privacy in the context of personal
information contained in medical records. He begins by assessing
both the existing controls on medical research and privacy controls
that could be applied in the medical researchcontext, including the
right of confidentiality, the right of privacy based in tort and constitutional law, and statutory protections. Concluding that current controls are inadequate to protectfully a patient'sprivacy in
his medical records, Professor Adams proposes a model that will
afford the patient sufficient privacy protection and at the same
time provide for the needs of the medical community.
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INTRODUCTION

C

ONTEMPORARY American legal standards are in a state of
tension. Much of this tension results from the balancing of
individual rights against societal needs. While such balancing always has been a part of our constitutional decision-making process, it has become more problematic in recent years as our
courts give increasing protection to individual rights and liberties,
while at the same time they recognize the impact that the exercise
of those rights has on other necessary societal conduct.
Tension between individual and societal expectations is a key
consideration in the protection of an individual's privacy. While
our society encourages the full and free dissemination of information, it recognizes that our "need to know" may be circumscribed
at times by an individual's reasonable expectation that certain information will not be disclosed. Courts and legislatures have
placed their imprimaturs on such expectations, declaring that individuals indeed possess certain rights of privacy.'
While the doctrines relating to the protection of privacy have
arisen in a variety of settings, they have not been expanded sufficiently to deal with the release to scientific researchers of information contained in medical records. Medical research is a vitally
important societal activity that yields many benefits to the community at large. At the same time, it is well recognized that the
individual patient or research subject has rights that must be safeguarded during research. Such protection, however, can prevent
or impede the progress of research. In balancing individual
rights against societal needs, safeguards have been developed
that incorporate basic community values while purporting to ac1. As used in this article, the term "privacy" is the "right to be left alone,"
and is a personal right asserted under tort, statutory, and constitutional law.
This definition conforms with the meaning traditionally given to the term "privacy." See, e.g., Kapellas v. Kofman, I Cal. 3d 20, 35, 459 P.2d 912, 921-22, 81
Cal. Rptr. 360, 369-70 (1969). "Confidentiality," as used here, is an expectation
that information will not be divulged that is based on the interpersonal relationship in which the information was created and supported by protective standards
found in the Hippocratic Oath or specific statutory provisions. The use of the
term "confidentiality" in this article is consistent with its use in case law. See,
e.g., Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See
generally Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 1109 (1968). Even though these two terms derive
from different legal sources, they are often used interchangeably to refer to areas where an individual has an expectation that data will not be divulged. For a
further discussion of these terms, see infra notes 39-145 and accompanying text.
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commodate the legitimate needs of both patient and researcher.
Yet, to date, most of these patient protections have been aimed
only at the prevention of physical harm. The intangible harm that
can result from disclosure of information in a patient's medical
records in the course of medical research has received only scant
attention.
An individual's medical records contain a vast amount of sensitive information that, if released to the general public, could be
the source of serious harm or embarrassment. Nevertheless,
many third parties, such as health insurers, have a legitimate need
for access to this information in order to act for the benefit of the
patient or society. Similarly, scientific research relies on access to
patient medical records in order to achieve medical advances.
The use of medical records 2 in medical research 3 bodes many
potential problems for the patients involved, 4 setting in stark re2. As used in this article, the term "medical records" refers to all files,
charts, and other documents in the custody of health care providers-both individual doctors and institutions-that contain data about the individuals identified in the documents.
3. As used in this article, the term "medical research" refers to systematic
scientific studies conducted to test certain assumptions or hypotheses regarding
problems for which satisfactory answers currently do not exist.
4. A government study led by Professor Alan F. Westin of Columbia University documents these problems and contains an exhaustive survey of the use
and abuse of health data. See A. WESTIN, COMPUTERS, HEALTH RECORDS, AND
CITIZEN RIGHTS (1976). Professor Westin's study team carefully documented
instances of loss of employment, denial of insurance, setbacks in the course of
medical treatment, and other detrimental effects of unrestricted sharing of medical information among agencies. The study concludes that legislation is sorely
needed to protect patient privacy in the face of pervasive and increasingly detailed medical record-keeping and the dissemination of private information.
These problems were also studied by the Privacy Protection Study Commission (Privacy Commission). See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION:

PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN

INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT]. The Privacy Commission was created by an amendment to the Privacy
Act of 1974. See Privacy Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-38, 91 Stat. 179 (1977)
(amending § 5(g) of Privacy Act of 1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982)).
The Act charged the Commission with studying personal privacy problems and
reporting on needed remedies. For a complete listing of the Privacy Commission's duties, see Privacy Act of 1974 § 5, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982)).
The Privacy Commission's report set forth detailed examples of personal
deprivations suffered by individuals when information obtained from their medical records reached entities that make decisions based on such data. School or
military records containing observations purporting to be medical but in fact
made by teachers or commanding officers who have no medical training are a
problem of particular concern. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 247-49.
Such supposed health data are disseminated into society, having acquired a professional patina of true medical judgment. Id. Thus, a child adjudged "hyperactive" or "retarded" by a school counselor may encounter difficulty obtaining a
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lief the conflict between societal benefits and personal privacy.
Researchers glean much of their experimental data from patient
records containing "private" personal information. Such records
often include patient-identifiable data that are not or cannot be
disguised adequately. This information, in turn, may be disclosed
to the researchers or their associates during data collection or to
other parties through publication of research results. The use of
sensitive patient information for research purposes, by parties
other than health care providers who engage in direct treatment
of the patient's condition, raises important legal and ethical questions. These questions relate primarily to the protection of the
patient's privacy and confidentiality, as well as to the patient's
control of access to medical records 5 and to his or her informed
consent" to the proposed research.
This article will attempt to set forth a mechanism that recognizes the patient's personal privacy interests in medical records
but that also accommodates society's need for scientific progress
by allowing medical research to go forward under proper controls. In the sections that follow, the existing controls on medical
research will be discussed and evaluated. It will be seen that even
though medical research is highly regulated, the present means of
protecting patients' interests in privacy and confidentiality are inadequate. For example, while the most recent report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (President's Commission) recognizes patients' privacy interests and the need to protect them from unwarranted intrusion by researchers, both the
current federal regulations and the President's Commission's
job or furthering his education. A. WESTIN, sIl/pa, at 80-8 1. Regardless of Iheir
accuracy, the release of medical records containing such judgments can be enormously harmful to an individual.
5. The general practice of hospitals is to give hospital personnel free access
to "charts" for bona fide purposes. Limited access is granted other "legitimately" interested parties such as health insurance carriers or employers. This
practice, however, does not entirely eliminate abuses. See supra note 4, ira
notes 43-46 & 94-96 and accompanying text. A patient has a legitimate cause
for concern because his access authorization is generally secured before a record
exists and before he knows whether sensitive information is recorded therein.
The authorization usually is in blanket form, further limiting the patient's protection and control. For a discussion of patients' right to access to their records,
and to limit third-party access, see infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text. See
also A. WESTIN, si/pra note 4, at 18-31, 47-51, 79-81; PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 299-300.
6. For a discussion of informed consent as it pertains to protection of and
access to confidential patient information, see infra notes 24 & 193-200 and accompanying text.
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proposals leave the problem to state regulation or private disposition. 7 Those applying these standards look for guidance from
other areas of the law that are incomplete, inconsistent or inadequate, and that fail to provide the effective controls needed to
solve the privacy dilemma.
After the flaws in the existing legal framework have been explored, the final section of the article will develop a model for
providing protections at an acceptable social cost while still allowing medical research to progress. This model can be incorporated into the mechanisms that already govern medical research,
either through legislation or, initially, through administrative regulation. If adopted, this proposal will ensure protection from unwarranted invasions of the patient's privacy and at the same time
will recognize the needs of the medical researcher to obtain data.
II.

CURRENT FEDERAL CONTROLS ON MEDICAL RESEARCH

Formal experimentation with human subjects for the purpose
of improving medical treatment has been pursued since at least
the eighteenth century. The impetus for regulations controlling
such research activities first appeared in the middle of the twentieth century in response to an increasing number of research
projects involving human subjects and to the Nuremberg Trials'
revelation of Nazi atrocities undertaken during World War II in
the name of medical science. 8 The first formal expression of ethi7. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SUMMING UP: FINAL REPORT ON STUDIES OF THE ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEIHAXVIORAL RESEARCH 34-38 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENTS COMMISSION REPORT].

At the request of then President Jimmy Carter, a commission (President's
Commission) was empaneled in 1980 to analyze the ethical and legal implications of medical care and research. The President's Commission was mandated
to study issues which included the privacy interests of patients. Accordingly, the
President's Commission conducted a hearing in which researchers, practitioners, and members of the Privacy Commission testified on current and proposed
mechanisms for ensuring the confidentiality of patient medical records. The
President's Commission retained Professor William Winslade as a consultant to

study the philosophical aspects of privacy.
In its final report, however, the President's Commission treated the issue of
patient privacy hesitantly. Acknowledging the tension between the law and eth-

ics ofmedical privacy and the need for detailed empirical exploration, the President's Commission merely encouraged health care providers to give greater

attention to privacy concerns. Id. It explained that the construction of a set of
statutory or administrative rules that would resolve the tension in the existing
law as a necessary task, but one too great for the President's Commission's existing resources. Id. at 37.

8. See United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 2 Trials of War
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cal guidelines for conducting research with human subjects was
the Declaration of Helsinki, issued by the World Medical Association in 1964.1 The Helsinki Declaration emphasized the rights of
the individual subject, the concept of informed consent, and the
principle that the "importance of the objective [be] in proportion
to the inherent risk to the subject."' 0
Two years after the issuance of the Declaration of Helsinki,
the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service
(PHS) issued a memorandum mandating that local institutional
committees on human investigation review and approve all research and training grants supported by PHS and involving
human subjects.' l Such institutional peer review was to "assure
an independent determination of (1) the rights and welfare of the
individual or individuals involved, (2) the appropriateness of the
method used to secure informed consent, and (3) the risks and
potential medical benefits of the investigation."' 2 In response to
comments from both grantor and grantee institutions, these
guidelines were refined in 1971. However, the guidelines' basic
objectives-protection of subject rights and assurance that benefits justified risks-remained the central focus of the review process. These objectives continue to be the key areas of inquiry
under federal regulations issued in 1974 in response to the 1974
3
National Research Act.'
The 1974 regulations govern all federally funded projects involving human subjects. 14 They also govern research that makes
use of patients' medical records. Any entity doing human subject
research funded by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is required to create an institutional review board
Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 181-82 (Military Tribunal I,
1947).
9. World Medical Ass'n, Human Experimentation: Code of Ethics of the ll'r/d
Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 177 (1964). The Helsinki Declaration enunciated the principles (1) that clinical research should be
based on adequate scientific background and experimental design, and responsible investigators should be "scientifically qualified persons;" and (2) that a findamental distinction exists "between clinical research in which the aim is
essentially therapeutic for a patient, and clinical research the essential object of
which is purely scientific and without therapeutic value to the person subjected
to the research." Id. at 177.
10. Id.
11. Memorandum from the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service
to the Heads of Institutional Service Grants, Feb. 8, 1966.
12. Id.
13. See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409 (1984).
14. See id. § 46.101.
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(IRB). The IRB's express function is to protect the rights and
welfare of the human subject. 1 5 Nearly all federal agencies that
support or conduct such research and have standards to govern
that research have adopted the basic HHS standards and proce16
dures spelled out in the 1974 National Research Act.
In practice, research studies governed by the HHS guidelines
originate when institutional staff members are confronted with a
medical question for which no satisfactory answer exists. The in15. The federal regulations governing protection of human subjects set
forth the following definitions:

"Human Subject" means a living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research obtains
(1) data through intervention or interaction with the individual, or
(2) identifiable private information. "Intervention" includes both physical procedures by which data are gathered (for example, venipuncture)
and manipulations of the subject or the subject's environment that are
performed for research purposes. "Interaction" includes communication or interpersonal contact between investigator and subject. "Private information" includes information about behavior that occurs in a
context in which an individual can reasonably expect that no observation or recording is taking place, and information which has been provided for specific purposes by an individual and which the individual
can reasonably expect will not be made public (for example, a medical
record). Private information must be individually identifiable (i.e., the
identity of the subject is or may readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated with the information) in order for obtaining the information to constitute research involving human subjects.
Id. § 46.102(0. See also National Research Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 289 1-1 to -3
(1982); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101 - .122 (1984); NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN

SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS 43 (1978) (reviewing
regulations of the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for the
protection of human subjects) [hereinafter cited as IRB REPORT].
While the above definitions appear to cover data collection from medical
records, this is not the case because another section exempts "[r]esearch involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, [or] records" and allows
at least every "investigator" access if certain conditions are met. 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.101(b)(5) (1984). Furthermore, the regulations only apply to "living" individuals. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102() (1984); 46 Fed. Reg. 8373 (1981) (defining the
term "living" as used in the regulations). Finally, it is clear that the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) did not intend its regulations to provide
primary privacy protections to patients; rather, it looked to "other federal, state,
and local laws or regulations . . .to protect the privacy of individuals and the
confidentiality of records." 46 Fed. Reg. 8372 (1981). As will be demonstrated
in this article, those other "protections" are both inadequate and illusory.
16. IRB REPORT,supra note 15, at 94. The report states that of 19 federal
entities (apart from HHS) that have regulations governing human subject research, 17 have adopted HHS standards (four strictly, eight strictly but with additions, and five approximately). Id. However, approximately one third of the
federal agencies have no policies at all on human subject research. Id. at 94-95.
Two of these, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, support research involving intervention in the subjects' lives without reviewing the "ethical acceptability of such
research . . .[nor] assuring the adequacy of informed consent." Id. at 95.
AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
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vestigator, often in conjunction with colleagues in areas of shared
interest, will develop a hypothesis and devise a method for testing
that hypothesis. In order to gain government funding to support
the proposed research, the investigator must prepare two documents, called "protocols," that describe the experiment. One
protocol discusses the proposal's scientific background and a
methodological approach to be used. It will describe the human
subject population to be studied, the type of analysis or intervention to be done, a rationale for working with a particular population and for selecting the study method, the manner in which data
will be analyzed, the pitfalls in study design that may affect the
generation and interpretation of data, and the potential significance of the research.17
The second protocol focuses on the ethical issues attending
performance of the research. This document states the study's
purpose, the human subject population at risk, the basis for selecting that population, the nature of risks, the measures for reducing potential risks, the anticipated benefits, and the manner in
which informed consent will be obtained.' 8
The HHS regulations stipulate that the institution requesting
HHS funds for research involving human subjects "shall provide
written assurance satisfactory to the Secretary that it will comply
with the requirements set forth in [the] regulations."' The department will conduct or fund research within the scope of the
regulations only if it has approved the institution's written assurance and if the institution has certified that the research has been
reviewed and approved by an appropriate IRB.211
Criteria for IRB approval include determinations that risks to
the subjects have been minimized, 2 1 that such risks are reasonable
in light of the anticipated benefits and the importance of the
knowledge to be gained,2 2 that selection of subjects is equitable,23
17. See Cowan, Humn Experimentation: The Review Process in Practice, 25 CAsE
W. REs. L. REv. 533, 537-46 (1975) (discussing protocol review procedures at
institutional and national levels).
18. Id. at 539-40.
19. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a) (1984). The Secretary is to evaluate and then
approve or disapprove each assurance submitted by institutions intending to
conduct research. Id. § 46.103(d), (e).
20. Id. § 46.103(b), (0. See generally Robertson, The Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484 (1979) (discussing legal considerations of institutionally controlled review mechanisms).
21. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1) (1984).
22. Id. § 46.111(a)(2).
23. Id. § 46.111 (a)(3). In making this determination, the IRB is to look to
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and that informed consent will be obtained and documented according to the guidelines set forth in the regulations.2 4 Where
appropriate, the research plan also must make adequate provisions for monitoring the data. 25 Similarly, there must be provisions assuring confidentiality of data as well as the protection of
the subjects' privacy. 2" Finally, where some or all subjects are
likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, additional
safeguards are mandated.

27

In 1978 the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (National Commission) published a report (IRB Report) in which it
evaluated the HHS regulations and made a number of recommendations. 28 It is clear from the IRB Report that the National Commission viewed the protection of subjects from physical risk as its
paramount concern. Only general reference was made to dangers
inherent in the privacy area. One recommendation, for example,
suggested that an IRB "be particularly attentive to the adequacy
of provisions [in the protocol] to protect the confidentiality of the
data." 2 1

The IRB Report also noted that an IRB should make

certain that the record keeper has balanced "the importance of
the research .. . [against] the risk to the individual from addi-

tional exposure of the record or information contained
therein," ': ) and imposed appropriate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure of the patient's health data . 3 Beyond this
"the

purposes of the research and the setting in which the research will be con-

ducted." Id.
24. Id. § 46.111 (a)(4), (5). The federal regulations specifically set forth
general guidelines for informed consent. Id.§ 46.116. These include: (1) a
statement that the study involves research; (2) a description of risk; (3) a lescription of benefit; (4) a disclosure of alternative procedures; (5) a statement
describing the extent to which confidentiality of records identifying the subject
will be maintained; (6) for research involving more than minimal risk, a statement with respect to compensation, if any, and treatment for injury should it
occur; (7) an explanation of who to contact for answers to questions; and (8) a
statement that participation is voluntary. Id.The regulations also provide that
the IRB may approve a less extensive consent procedure in certain cases or
waive the requirement altogether. Id.§ 46.116(c), (d).
25. Id.§ 46.111 (a)(6). The underlying purpose of this requirement is to
ensure the safety of subjects. Id.
26. Id.§ 46.11l(a)(7).
27. Id.§ 46.111 (b). The subjects entitled to these additional protections
include those with severe physical or mental illness and those who are educationally or economically disadvantaged. Id.
28. See IRB REPORT, supra note 15.
29. Id.at 31.
30. Id.at 29.
31. Id.
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general counsel, however, the report failed to give guidance for
handling or avoiding risks to privacy.
Remarkably, the most recent HHS regulations display even
less concern with patients' privacy rights than does the IRB Report. 2 As revised, the regulations actually exempt from IRB
scrutiny a number of categories of research involving no physical
harm. These new exemptions include research involving "the
collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are
publicly available or if the information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, [either]
''3
directly or through identifiers linked to the subject."
The focus of the regulations on physical harm is understandable because much human subject research involves actual patient
contact through, for example, clinical observation, the taking of
tissue samples, or the administration of drugs. 4 However, in
many other types of research, the use of medical records may precede or even replace patient contact, with the researcher simply
using preexisting patient records as part of a research project.
Such retrospective review of patient data without patient contact
raises the risk of intrusion into a patient's privacy. Yet, these nonphysical risks have been ignored substantially in recently promulgated regulations. 5 Under the present design an IRB simply
does not review research proposals with a view to protecting the
individual from the dissemination of confidential or private information when there is no prospect of actual physical danger to the
patient.
Both the relevant federal regulations and the most recent report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission (Privacy Commission) appear to expect the needed privacy controls to come
from other areas of the law.." Unfortunately, however, neither
32. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(5) (1984); 46 Fed. Reg. 8372 (1981) (noting
that enforcement of federal, state, and local laws protecting individual privacy
rights is left to the researcher and the institution). For a further discussion of
the HHS regulations, see supra note 15.
33. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(5) (1984). For a further discussion of these exemptions, see supra note 15.
34. See IRB REPORT, supra note 15, at 21, 29-31.
35. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(2)-(5) (1984); 46 Fed. Reg. 8370-72 (1981).
For a discussion of the federal regulations' emphasis on physical risks to human
subjects, see sUpra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of the intent of federal regulatory agencies to depend
on other law for information access controls and privacy protections, see supra
note 15. For a discussion of the Privacy Commission, its duties, and its purpose,
see u/nra note 4 and accompanying text.
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existing statutory protections nor common law principles adequately address the privacy concerns of patients whose medical
records may be available to researchers. Although a number of
statutes and common law concepts do deal with the privacy question tangentially, none provides a comprehensive or consistent
set of guidelines. Concepts governing issues such as patient access to records and informed consent are relevant but fall far
short of providing effective guidance: Access to records remains
a continuing source of controversy between patient and physician;317 and informed consent, generally given before any treatment begins or any record is developed, is a specious concept in
the context of protecting such records, because a patient has insufficient knowledge to consent to the dissemination of personal
information in advance.3 8 Other aspects of the law involving
medical research that merit more careful attention include the
right of confidentiality between patient and physician, the patient's right to privacy, and statutory developments of the right to
privacy. The next section will discuss and evaluate these aspects
as potential vehicles with which to protect personal privacy in the
field of medical research.
III.

OTHER POSSIBLE CONTROLS ON MEDICAL RESEARCH

A.

The Right to Confidentiality

A patient's right to the confidentiality of his medical records
has always been a basic tenet of the physician-patient relationship.
Medical care providers owe their patients a duty to protect personal information from unwarranted public disclosure."!' This
37. Patients are increasingly insistent upon both knowing what their medical records contain and holding medical personnel accountable for all aspects of
diagnosis and treatment. Physicians, on the other hand, justify restraint on patien access on the basis that the information either may be misunderstood, or, if
understood, will have some detrimental effect on the patient. Patient access,
however, remains important for purposes of insuring accuracy.
38. Traditionally, informed consent has involved a request for consent that
is made before treatment begins. Such advance consent amounts to a virtual
blanket release before a record has even been established, much less read or
understood by the patient.
39. E. HAYT, MEDICOLEGAL ASPECTS OF HOSPITAL RECORDS 13 (2d ed.
1977). For a general discussion of the physician-patient privilege as it pertains
to patient medical records, see Annot., 10 A.L.R.4th 552 (1981).
The physician-patient confidentiality privilege did not exist at common law.
See People v. Deadmond, - Colo. -, -, 683 P.2d 763, 769 (1984); Wesley Medical Center v.Clark, 234 Kan. 13, 24, 669 P.2d 209, 218 (1983). [he privilege is
a creature both of statute and of custom and practice within the medical profession, designed primarily to ensure communication of all necessary information
between patient and physician. See State v. Santeyan, 136 Ariz. 108, 110, 664
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duty, which underlies the Hippocratic Oath 40 taken by all physicians, arises from the inherently intrusive character of proper diagnosis and treatment. 4 ' The general ethical duty embodied in
the Oath is either codified or established by case law in approximately nineteen states. 42 There is, however, no comprehensive
legal protection for the confidentiality of patient data, and patient
protection generally rests on the medical profession's customary
obedience to the Oath and the principles behind it.
P.2d 652, 654 (1983). Codified versions of the physician-patient privilege usually proscribe disclosure of confidential information acquired during treatment,
unless the patient consents. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(4) (1978);
CAL. EVID. CODE § 994 (West Supp. 1984). However, the absence of a codified
physician-patient privilege is often understood to suggest that the public's need
to know outweighs the individual patient's interest in confidentiality. See Mull v.
String, 448 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1984). For a discussion of statutory enactments
prohibiting disclosure of confidential patient information, see R. MORRIS & A.
MORIrZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 228 (5th ed. 1971).
40. In its classic form, the Hippocratic Oath provides that "[w]hat I may see
or hear in the course of treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to
the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep myself
holding such things shameful to be spoken about." L. EDELSTEIN, THE HippoCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION 3 (1943). See also
Cooper, The Physician's Dilemma: Protection of the Patient's Right to Privacy, 22 ST.

Louis U.LJ. 397 (1978) (reviewing evolution of patient's right to confidentiality
and privacy).
41. The American Medical Association, in response to the sensitive nature
of the disclosure issue, has adopted the following as § 9 of its principles of medical ethics:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the
course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the
character of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or unless it
becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or
of the community.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N,

OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL

5

(1977). Commentators have suggested that the duty arising tinder the American
Medical Association's principles of medical ethics is less comprehensive than
that arising under the Hippocratic oath. See Cooper, supra note 40, at 399. Accordinglv, courts may balance the patient's interest in privacy and confidentiality
against competing public interests. See, e.g., People v.Florendo, 95 11. 2d 155,
447 N.E.2d 282 (1983) (grand jury's interest in conducting investigation outweighs ConlfidClentiality interest); Bratt v. IBM, 392 Mass. 508, 467 N.E.2d 126
(1984) (employer's valid and substantial interest in medical records outweighs
employee's interest in confidentiality); State v. Kupchun, 117 N.H. 412, 373
A.2d 1325 (1977) (state's interest in determining whether commitment for
mental health treatment is necessary overrides physician-patient privilege); In re
Doe Children, 93 Misc. 2d 479, 402 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Fain. Ct. 1978) (child's interest in being free from neglect and abuse outweighs parent's interest in confidentiality); In re Grand Jury Investigation,

-

R.I.

-,

441 A.2d 525 (1982)

(supremacy clause interests override physician-patient privilege in Medicaid
fraud grand jury investigation).
42. A SUMMARY OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY LAWS OF TIlE 50
STATES, ACCESS REPORTS 1 (Richard Henry ed. 1975). For a survey of physicianpatient privilege case law, see Annot., 10 A.L.R. 4th 552 (1981).
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A review of state court decisions addressing the confidentiality of medical records affords meager guidance for establishing a
framework for the protection of medical records. Cases in this
area involve disparate factual situations and varying legal approaches, thus making it difficult to deduce a single, general pattern of protection. Some patterns, however, are discernible.
A physician's disclosure of confidential patient information
has been held to violate the patient's rights where a physician
43
conveyed disparaging information to a former patient's in-laws;
where a psychiatrist published a book detailing treatment of a former patient without adequately concealing the patient's identity; 44 where a physician sought to publish photographs of a
patient's treatment; 45 and where a physician forwarded a medical
report on his patient to the patient's adversary in an accident
43. Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958). In Beroy, the
defendant physician responded to an inquiry by another physician, who was not
and did not purport to be treating the plaintiff, as to the plaintiff's mental history. Id. at 194-95, 331 P.2d at 816. The defendant physician's response contained several statements relating to the plaintiff's mental health problems. Id.
The court recognized that important societal interests might justify such a disclosure of confidential medical information. Id. at 196-98, 331 P.2d at 817-18.
The court concluded, however, that disclosures must be exercised with caution
and in good faith, reported fairly, and limited in terms of the information conveyed and the recipients thereof. Id. at 199-201, 331 P.2d at 819-20. Using
those criteria, the Beny court reversed the trial court's conclusion that the disclosure was justified, and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 201-02, 331 P.2d at 82021.
44. Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977). In Doe
v. Roe, the defendant physician published a book on psychiatry that, without the
plaintiff patients' consent, contained sensitive verbatim disclosures made h
them during the course of their treatment. Id. at 203, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 670-71.
The court concluded that the physician who agrees to render medical services
impliedly covenants not to disclose information conveyed to him or her during
the course of treatment. Id. at 210, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 674-75. It further concluded that disclosures of confidential information may also give rise to an action for breach of privacy. Id. at 211-13, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 675-76. Rejecting the
defense that the scientific value of the publication outweighed the patients' confidentiality or privacy interests, the court awarded compensatory damages and
enjoined further circulation of the book. Id. at 214, 217-18, 400 N.Y.S.2d at
677, 679-80.
45. Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940). In ClaVnaii, the plaintiff patient sought the return of photographs that documented the effects of her
illness during unconsciousness. Id. at 543-44. The photographs, taken while
the plaintiff was semiconscious, showed severe facial disfiguration. Id. Relying
on an invasion of privacy theory of liability, the court concluded that photographs depicting one's facial features may not be made public without consent.
Id. at 546. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff waived
her right of privacy by entering into the physician-patient relationship. Id. at
548. Accordingly, the Clayman court ordered the physician to return all photographs and negatives. Id. at 550-51.
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case.4" Because each of these fact patterns involves revelation of
intimate data for use by an inappropriate third party or for financially exploitative purposes, these cases are of little precedential
value in situations where such data is revealed to a medical researcher who does not use the information in any exploitative
way.
Unfortunately, in cases where disclosure did not involve inappropriate third parties or exploitation, state courts often have
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints. For example, in Clark v. Geraci,4 7 where a physician disclosed to a patient's employer that the

patient was an alcoholic, the New York Supreme Court found that
the patient had waived the right to confidentiality by authorizing
partial disclosure. The patient had sought a medical excuse for
his absenteeism. When the physician also divulged information
regarding the patient's alcoholism, the employer dismissed the
patient from employment. The patient then sued the physician
for breach of confidentiality. The court construed the patient's
request for an excuse from work as a waiver by estoppel." x In
another New York case, Munzer v. Blaisdell,411 the director of a state
psychiatric institution who had released a patient's record was
found not liable. The court found no physician-patient relationship between the director and the psychiatric patient, and thus
did not invoke a presumed duty of confidentiality. 50 Courts in
New Jersey and Nebraska have relied on public policy justifications to uphold a physician's disclosure of a child's genetic heart
defect to an insurance company, 5 1 and a physician's erroneous
46. Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962) (per
curiam). In Alexander, live plaintiffs sought recovery for personal injuries sustained in an auto accident with the defendant. Id.at 79-80, 177 A.2d at 143-44.
Before trial, a physician retained by the defendant induced a plaintiff's physician
to disclose a medical report as to the plaintiff's physical condition. Id. at 79-80,
177 A.2d at 146. While not dispositive of the case, the court acknowledged the
duty of the plaintiff's physician to aid his patient in litigation, a duty that includes not disclosing medical information to his patient's adversary. id.
47. 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960). For a discussion of
the Geraci decision, see Case Comment, Action for Disclosure of Privileged Colmiintications: Clark v.Geraci, 10 Art. U.L. REv. 219 (1961).
48. 29 Misc. 2d at 793-94, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
49. 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944), jffd as modified, 269
A.D. 970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. Div. 1945).
50. Id. at 776, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
51. Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962). In Hag-e, the
plaintiffs sought to collect life insurance proceeds on the death of their infant
daughter. Id. at 330-31, 181 A.2d at 345-46. During an investigation of the
merits of the insurance claim, the defendant physician disclosed, without the
plaintiffs' consent, that the child had died of a congenital heart defect. Id. The
insurance claim was denied. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiffs filed suit based on
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statement to a hotel manager that a patron had syphilis. 52
One state case that did seem to hold promise for a confidentiality-based limitation on the dissemination of private medical in53
formation to researchers was the New York case of Doe v. Roe.
There, the court found that a patient's right to confidentiality was
violated when his psychiatrist published data that did not adequately disguise the patient's identity. The court based its decision on a number of theories, one of which was an implied
covenant to avoid disclosure of information gleaned in the course
of a professional relationship. 54 Such a promise of silence,
whether express or implied, has been the basis of a cause of action for breach of contract in other cases between errant physicians and patients. 5 5 The Doe court also stated that the fiduciary
the alleged breach of the duty not to disclose confidential information. Id.at
331, 181 A.2d at 346. The court stated that since New Jersey had no express
public policy on point, the interests at issue had to be balanced. Id. at 335, 181
A.2d at 348. It concluded that the public interest in exposing information relevant to the resolution of the plaintiffs' insurance claim outweighed the plaintiffs'
interest in confidentiality, and thus denied liability for the disclosure. Id. at 336,
181 A.2d at 349.
Following the Hague decision, NewJersey enacted legislation providing for a
physician-patient privilege. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.2 (West 1976).
The statute, however, expressly allows disclosure where the patient's medical
condition is the subject oflegal action. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.4 (1976).
See Lazorick v. Brown, 195 N.J. Super. 444, 480 A.2d 223 (1984) (discussing
Hague; allowing defendant physicians and defense counsel in medical malpractice action to speak privately with treating physicians concerning nonprivilcged
matters).
52. Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (per
curiam). In Simonsen, the plaintiff was required to work away friom home, and
therefore resided in a hotel in the town in which business was to be conducted.
Id. at 225, 177 N.W. at 831. Plaintiff developed sores on his body while staying
at the hotel, and was seen by the defendant hotel's physician. /d. l'he physician
concluded plaintiff had syphilis, a highly contagious disease. Id. Fearing a
spread of the disease, the physician conveyed his diagnosis to the hotel manager,
who promptly removed plaintiff from the hotel. Id. at 225-26, 177 N.W. at 831.
In deciding the claim for breach of duty not to disclose, the court found the
physician-patient relationship to be a highly confidential one. Id. at 227, 177
N.W. at 832. However, the court found the public's interest to be safe from
dangerously contagious diseases to be of greater concern. Id. at 228-29, 177
N.W. at 832. Disclosure was therefore allowed because the defendant physician
had reasonable grounds for his belief, limited the disclosure to reasonaby necessary information, and acted in good faith. Id. at 230, 177 N.W. at 833.
53. 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977). For a further discussion of Doe, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
54. 93 Misc. 2d at 210, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
55. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D.
Ohio 1965) (holding third party insurance company liable for inducing physician
to breach contractual duty to treat plaintiff); Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287
So. 2d 824 (1973) (finding implied contract in ordinary course of dealing between patient and physician; implied contract includes covenant of
nondisclosure).
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nature of the physician-patient relationship obligated the physician to avoid unwarranted disclosure. 56 The Doe court specifically
rejected the psychiatrist's defense of "scientific value," holding
that public policy dictated that the "curiosity or education of the
medical profession" should not be allowed to supersede the physician's duty of confidentiality. 57 The court concluded that "conflicts between ethical obligations and scientific advance must be
'5
resolved in favor of the ethical consideration." 1
Because Doe v. Roe uses the implied covenant concept and
rejects the scientific value defense, the case has useful implications for patient protection against medical research disclosure.
However, the court explicitly reserved comment on cases in which
the identities of patients are fully concealed or the scientific discovery is too important to concede the patient's privilege of nondisclosure, 511making the case amenable to narrow interpretation.
It remains the task of future courts to decide what kinds of scientific enterprise are important enough to outweigh the principle of
confidentiality.
State licensure statutes provide another potential basis for a
cause of action for violation of duties of confidentiality in the
medical research area. The Nebraska Supreme Court observed in
56. 93 Misc. 2d at 209-10, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
57. Id. at 214, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
58. Id. at 214 n.9, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 677 n.9. To support its position, the Doe
court cited a report by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. This report states:
When the psychiatrist describes the details of the life history of his
patient, his job problems, et cetera, the possibility of recognition is very
high.
For this reason clinical data may have to be disguised with consequent impairment of the objective scientific value. Sometimes material
may be so impossible to camouflage that it should not be published at
all, in spite of its scientific value.
Such ethical requirements take priority over research objectives.
Id. (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 45
(1960)).
59. Id. at 214, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 677. The court took notice of several cases
involving interests that might cause the patient's interest in confidentiality to be
compromised. Id. One such case involved a patient who clearly presented a
threat to the physical safety of others. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
13 Cal. 3d 177, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 529 P.2d 553 (1974) (en banc), vacated on
rehearing, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976) (en banc).
Another case involved a patient with a contagious disease. See Hoffman v.
Blackman, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1970). The Doe court further observed that the
physician-patient privilege may have to yield in order to accomodate certain statutory enactments. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 1975) (requiring physicians to report gunshot and other similar wounds); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW §§ 3355, 3373 (McKinney 1977) (requiring the report of the use of controlled substances in certain situations).
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one case that the state's licensure statute would give rise to a civil
action for damages for any "betrayal of a professional secret," but
held in the same case that public health concern about syphilis
overrode the patient's right to confidentiality. 6°
By contrast, a Tennessee court held that a state medical Iicensure statute was not an appropriate vehicle for allowing a patient to maintain a civil cause of action for wrongful disclosure of
medical information.i" This decision, however, appears to represent the more unlikely outcome in any state that forbids betrayal
of professional secrets in its medical licensure statutes.
Aside from licensure statutes, other state laws exist that
could be employed to render a physician liable for breach of the
duty of confidentiality in regard to patient information. For example, in Doe v. Roe, the court also relied on an interpretation of
New York's Education, Mental Hygiene, and Public Health
Laws. 62 The court stated that the legislature
intended to reinforce the public policy of this state expressed in numerous statutes and regulations .
prohibiting physicians, persons in allied fields and medical institutions from disclosing without authorization of
the patient, information discovered in attending the patient . . . [and] intended that "the statute . . .have a
' 3
broad and liberal construction to carry out its policy.""

Despite some encouraging developments at the state level,
other aspects of existing statutory protections of confidentiality
are less hopeful. For example, as of 1975, only twenty-one states
had licensure laws that provided for revocation of a physician's
license for unprofessional conduct, conduct which includes the
intentional or willful revelation of health information acquired in
60. Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 227, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920)

(per curiam). For a discussion of the facts of Simonsen, see supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
61. Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965) (plaintiff
sued physician alleging wrongful disclosure of medical findings to defense attorney, but disclosure was held to be not prejudicial because information would
have been available to attorney on discovery).
62. 93 Misc. 2d at 208, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 673. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HVG.
LAW §

33.13 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1984). This statute requires that clinical

records be maintained and that such information be kept within the State Department of Mental Hygiene, apart from certain exceptions enumerated in the
statute. The primary purpose of the statute is to maintain the subject's confidentiality. Application of Hild, 124 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
63. 93 Misc. 2d at 208, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 673 (quoting New York City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940)) (citations omitted).
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protect the confidentiality of medical records in the judicial process by way of testimonial privileges,65 some courts have construed the physician-patient privilege in favor of the testifying
physician so long as the patient and physician are not adversaries

in the litigation.""
Recent proposals for statutory protection are not encouraging. For example, the Privacy Commission does not treat the confidentiality of patient data as one of its primary concerns in the
medical research context. Its recommendations regarding "rec-

ord-keeping in the medical care relationship" contain conflicting

premises. 67 After stating initially that "confidentiality of the medical-care relationship has been seriously eroded and clearly needs
to be restored,"" 8 and that there is a "lack of a legitimate, enforceable, expectation of confidentiality,"(31 the Privacy Commission Report cites only two situations involving personal
64. See Britton, Rights to Privacy in Mledical Records, J. LEGAL MED.,July 1975,
at 32.
In defining "unprofessional conduct," some state licensure statutes provide
exhaustive lists of examples. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-613 (1979 & Supp.
1983) (including as example willful betrayal of professional secret); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-36-117 (1978 & Supp. 1983) (lacking express reference to disclosure
of confidential information). Where exhaustive lists of examples are provided,
the courts have confined themselves to the definitions set forth bv the statute.
See Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828
(1968); Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v..Iorgensen, 198 Colo. 275,
599 P.2d 869 (1979) (en banc). Numerous statutes simply provide that a physician's license may be revoked or suspended in instances of unprofessional conduct. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6509(9) (McKINNEY SUPP. 1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 63-19-107 (Supp. 1984).
65. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, sutpra note 4, at 284. This privilege allows a patient to prevent a physician from testifying about the patient's medical
condition. The Privacy Commission's report observes that 43 states have testimonial privilege statutes. Id. It notes further that the contemporary trend is
toward extending this privilege to records such as medical records, X-rays, and
laboratory tests. Id.
Typically, testimonial privilege statutes provide as follows:
No physician shall be allowed, in any civil matter, to disclose anv
information which he acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, which shall tend to blacken the character of the patient, without consent of said patient, except in civil matters brought by such patient, for damages on account of personal injuries.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5929 (1982).
66. See, e.g., Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct.
1960) (allowing physician's disclosure of plaintiff's alcoholic condition to plaintiff's employer, resulting in plaintiff's discharge).
67. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 292-317.
68. Id. at 281.
69. Id. at 292.
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embarrassments resulting from unwarranted disclosure in the
course of research.7 1 More significantly, research qualifies as an
exclusion from the enhanced protection of confidentiality that the
7
Commission recommends for statutory enactment in the states. '
Similarly, a model bill on confidentiality proposed by the American Medical Association also excepts medical research from its
7y2
strictures on disclosure of confidential health care information.
The Privacy Commission justified the exclusion of research from
the duty of confidentiality on practical grounds. It noted the difficulty of obtaining consent for use of patient records from large
numbers of persons who long since may have moved away or
whose refusal might skew the results of a study. 73 Moreover, delays caused by exaggerated concern for confidentiality could stifle
epidemiological research so as to pose imminent or existing
threats to public health. A requirement of patient authorization
might well have prevented critical research in two recent studies
70. Id. at 309-10. For a discussion of the "embarrassing" disclosures considered by the Privacy Commission, see infra notes 94-96 and accompanying

text.
71. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT. supra note 4, at 306 (recommendation
(10)(c)(i)-(v)). Specifically, the Commission's recommendation provides:
That each medical-care provider be considered to owe a duty of confidentiality to any individual who is the subject of a medical record it
maintains, and that, therefore, no medical care provider should disclose, or be required to disclose, in individually identifiable form, any
information about any such individual without the individual's explicit
authorization, unless the disclosures would be: . .. for use in conducting a biomedical or epidemiological research project. provided that
the medical-care provider maintaining the medical record:
(i) determines that such use or disclosure does not violate any
limitations under which the record or information was collected:
(ii) ascertains that use or disclosure in individually identifiable
form is necessary to accomplish the research or statistical purpose for
which use or disclosure is to be made;
(iii) determines that the importance of the research or statistical
purpose for which any use or disclosure is to be made is such as to
warrant the risk to the individual from additional exposure of the record or information contained therein;
(iv) requires that adequate safeguards to protect the record or information from unauthorized disclosure be established and maintained
by the user or recipient, including a program for removal or destruction of identifiers; and
(v) consents in writing before any further use or redisclosure of
the record or information in individually identifiable form is permitted.
Id. at 306-07.
72. AMA MODEL STATE BILL ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALIH CARE INFORMATION § 4(b)(4), reprinted in A. WESTIN, snpra note 4, at 351. The term "confidential health care information" relates to a person's health care history,
diagnosis, condition, treatment or evaluation. Id. § 3(c), reprinted in A. WESTIN,
smpro note 4, at 350.
73. Id. at 309.
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involving Legionnaire's Disease and DES (diethylstilbestrol). 74
Thus, neither present nor proposed standards adequately address
the release of confidential patient data to qualified researchers;
and under existing case law, most such releases probably would
not be considered a breach of confidentiality. Moreover, because
the many legal theories on which the duty of confidentiality has
been based do not provide clear guidance for proper conduct,
this is an area ripe for litigation. The issue requires a comprehensive approach that would clarify existing law and provide a workable set of standards.
B.

The Right to Privacy

Both ethical and moral principles incorporate a regard for
the individual's right to be left alone. 75 The law, however, was
slow to grant redress for the dissemination of the intimate details
of one's personal life. Like the patient's privilege of nondisclosure, the rights of an individual to make decisions in private and
to prevent public knowledge of those decisions have emerged
only in sporadic bursts of judicial or legislative energy.
There was no per se right to privacy at common law. 7"1

In

1890, however, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued in a
landmark law review article that a "right of privacy" had always
existed, its tenets implicit in the laws of property, defamation,
74. In each of these research situations, time was of the essence in order to
identify and locate infected or affected individuals. In the Legionnaire's Disease
example, researchers were compelled to isolate the cause of the disease by utilizing broad patient data with the hope of diminishing the number of fiaalities. In
the DES (diethylstibestrol) example, it was learned that there is a statistically
significant association between prenatal ingestion of certain stilbene derivatives
and the subsequent occurrence of adenocarcinoma (a malignant tumnor) and
clear cell adenosis in female offspring sometime after puberty. Access to appropriate medical records of mothers was essential to efficacious treatment and
monitoring of daughters. A number of potentially affected DES daughters, however, later brought forth their medical records as a concomitant to a products
liability/medical malpractice lawsuit. For a discussion of the Legionnaire's Disease and DES incidents, see PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 309.
See also Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984)
(DES products liability action allowing limited discovery of plaintiff's medical
records, balancing defendant drug company's need for information against privacy interests of medical records registry established to study DES).
75. See Lebacqz & Levine, Respecifor Persons and Infrmned Consent to Participate
in Research, 25 CINICAL RESEARCH 101 (1977) (exploring fundamental requirements of informed consent).
76. See Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1983); W.
KEETON,

D.
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copyright, and nuisance. 77 Shortly after publication of this piece
the courts in New York and Georgia were faced with cases involving privacy questions. In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. ,78 the
plaintiff claimed that her privacy had been invaded by the defendant's use of her photograph to advertise flour without her consent. The New York Court of Appeals, viewing the recognition of
a right to privacy as improper judicial lawmaking, rejected her
claims.9 Public outrage at the decision, however, led the New
York Legislature to enact a limited privacy statute designed to
prevent the type of commercial expropriation that occurred in
Roberson.8 1 1 In 1905, in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. ,'"
the Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged a right to privacy.
The plaintiffs name and picture, along with a fictitious testimonial, had been used to advertise the defendant's insurance. In allowing recovery of damages in tort, the court expressly rejected
the majority view in Roberson.Y2 These two cases mark the beginnings of a judicially and legislatively recognized right to privacy
that would be the focus of considerable subsequent attention.
Although it has since received fairly widespread judicial ac77. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193-213
(1890). Because the common law in these four areas had developed to the stage
of permitting causes of action where the only discernible wrong was an intangible one, it was reasonable to label such actions "merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be left alone." Id. at
205. The authors argued that existing theories of implied contract, trust, or
breach of confidence could be other forms of a right to be free from prying
publicity. Id. at 210-12. Warren and Brandeis urged the courts to call this already-protected interest the "right to privacy" and argued that it should apply in
future cases of unwarranted invasion of a person's private affairs. Id. at 209-213.
The authors hastened to add, however, that they were not advocating "judicial
legislation"; because privacy already existed as a principle they were merely urging judicial application, Id. at 213 n. 1.
78. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). For a discussion of the Roberson decision. see Comment, Ai Actionable Riglit of Privacy? Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 12 YAt.LE L.J. 35 (1902).
79. 171 N.Y. at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
80. See Act of Apr. 6, 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308 (codified at
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1984)). The act essentially provides that the use of another's name, picture, or portrait without such
person's written consent is a misdemeanor, and may be remedied by an action
for damages or injunction. Id. See also Shields v. Gross, 58 N.Y.2d 338, 448
N.E.2d 108, 461 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1983) (reviewing the Robersoii decision in light of
the statutory right to privacy; recognizing the right to privacy where photographs are used for advertising purposes).
81. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
82. Id. at 211-17, 50 S.E. at 77-79. Justice Cobb took the view that the
common law maxim ubijus ibi remedimi (for every right there shall be a remedy)
should apply. Id. at 194, 50 S.E. at 69.
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ceptance by the state courts, 3 the right to privacy has not experienced uniform development among jurisdictions. As a result, it
has evolved into a multifaceted right, three aspects of which are
particularly relevant to a consideration of the use of patient data
for medical research. These three developments involve the acceptance of the right to privacy as a branch of tort law, 8 4 constitutional interpretations

of the right to privacy, 8 5 and recent

statutes8 "

or constitutional amendments aimed at protecting privacy, including the Federal Privacy Act of 1974.87 Each of these
will be discussed below.
1. Development of Privacy in Tort Law
The Second Restatement of Torts formulates a cause of action for
"unreasonable interference with privacy" and divides violations
of the right of privacy into four categories: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to or
disclosure of another's private life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the public.88 With
respect to research involving medical records, the right to privacy
implicates two of these categories: freedom from "unreasonable
intrusion" and freedom from "disclosure of private facts."
Because it requires no publicity, the tort of unreasonable intrusion easily could include unreasonable investigation of medical

information. Intentional and unreasonable investigation of an individual's mail, bank account, or other personal documents constitutes an actionable invasion of privacy."!) Only public records
83. In 1956, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that only twenty states had a
judicially recognized right to privacy. Bremmer v. journal-Tribune Publishing
Co., 247 Iowa 817,821.76 N.W.2d 762, 765 (1956). At present, however, only
Rhode Island continues to reject a right to privacy. See PROSSER & KEETON, sHpra
note 76, § 117, at 851 & n. 18 (citing Note, Tort Recovervfor Invasioi of Priv'cy. 59
Ni-i. 1. RE'. 808 (1980)).
84. For a discussion of this tort aspect, see ii'fra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
85. For a discussion of this constitutional aspect, see infia notes 97-143 and
accompanying text.
86. For a discussion of this statutory aspect, see infia notes 148-83 and accompanying text. These statutes are aimed at fair information practices by government entities and other organizations.
87. For a discussion of the Federal Privacy Act of 1974, see i)fa notes 16573 and accompanying text. [here are also other federal laws containing privacy
guarantees such as those governing drug abuse surveillance, )Iblic health,
juveniles, and banking.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORrs, § 652A (1976).
89. Id. § 652B comment h.
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are exempt from the purview of this tort 3 1 Because medical
records are not public records as defined by the Second Restatement,'' a patient whose record is viewed by non-health care providers without proper authorization could bring suit for tortious
intrusion. However, this tort is limited by the requirement that
the intrusion be "unreasonable." Disclosure of medical information to a researcher may be deemed wholly "reasonable" in many
circumstances, thereby defeating a viable cause of action for the
intrusion tort.
The tort of disclosure of private facts is defined by the Second
Restatement as publicity given to private matters that would be
"highly offensive to a reasonable person" and "not of legitimate
concern to the public.'9 2 Although it easily may apply to certain
types of medical information, this tort, because it deals with offensive or embarrassing information, requires communication to a
large group of persons, not a mere few.!-3 The limiting effect of
this broad publicity requirement can be illustrated by a typical
disclosure situation noted by the Privacy Commission.9J4 A witness from the National Institute of Mental Health told the Commission of a member of a research team doing a follow-up study
of people who had been enrolled in a methadone maintenance
90. Id. § 652B comment c. Comment c to § 652B provides that "[t]he defendant is subject to liability ... only when he has intruded into a private place,
or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about
his person or affairs." Id. The comment continues by noting that "there is no
liability for the examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff, or of
documents that the plaintiff is required to keep and make available for public
inspection." Id. Thus, disclosure of public records does not give rise to a privacy action. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B comment c (1976). At common law, a "public record" is defined as a record that mtIst be kept in the discharge ofa dutV imposed by law. Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 221-22, 386 A.2d
846, 851 (1978). A public record must constitute a written memorial that is
made by a public official who is authorized by law to make the record. Id. at 222,
386 A.2d at 851.
Some state statutes expressly exclude medical records from the definition of
public documents, making disclosure al invasion of privacy. Sep, e.g., GA. CODE

§ 50-18-72 (Supp. 1984). However, other state statutes, such as public disclosure acts, may bring medical records within the ambit of public records. See
Oliver v. Harborview Medical Center, 94 Wash. 2d 559, 618 P.2d 76 (1984)
(medical records of patient at public hospital are public records subject to disclosure under state public disclosure act).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D (1976).
93, Id. § 652D comment a. Comment a suggests that the crucial inquiry is
whether the communication was public or private. Id.
94. See PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 309 (quoting MEDICAL
ANN.

RECORDS HEARINGS 83 (July 20, 1976) (testimony of National Institute of Mental
Health)).
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program. These people had gone to another former enrollee's
residence to attend a party on a Saturday night. Upon his arrival
at the party the visitor proceeded to introduce himself as a researcher conducting a follow-up study of patients who had been
enrolled in the methadone maintenance program.9 5 Despite the
blatant offensiveness of such a disclosure of private information,
it is unlikely that it would satisfy the broad publicity requirement
for tort recovery under the Second Restatement. 6
Thus, although the torts of disclosure and intrusion may be
applicable to medical records research in extreme situations, the
scope of their protection is inadequate to assure informational
privacy in the ordinary situations in which medical records are
used. Other legal doctrines are needed to carry out this task.
2.

Development of Privacy in ConstitutionalLaw

Although there is doubt as to the precise source of the doctrine, invasion of personal privacy has taken on constitutional
dimensions. Constitutional protection has been applied to informational privacy, and could therefore be a source of control on
the use of medical records by researchers.
As long ago as 1928,Justice Brandeis, dissenting in a government wiretap case, insisted that the "right to be left alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," was protected from unjustifiable governmental intrusion by the fourth amendment. 7 In another dissent in the same
case, Justice Holmes proposed that the fourth amendment might
have a "penumbra" within which privacy was protected."8
Later, Justice Douglas raised the notion of penumbral zones
of protection to the level of accepted constitutional doctrine. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,!' !) a state ban on contraceptives was held to
95. Id.
96. Compare Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133 (1974)
(defendant's notifying four persons of plaintiff's debt was not unreasonable
publicity) with Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (publicizing

a customer's overdue account by posting a large sign in a window for public view
was beyond reason and thus an invasion of privacy).
97. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis argued that any unjustified intrusion into an individual's privacy is a violation of the fourth amendment, regardless of the means
employed. Id.
98. Id. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes' dissent was narrower than that of Justice Brandeis. Holmes limited the scope of unjustified
privacy intrusions to instances in which officers of ihe law committed crimes to
obtain evidence. Id. at 469-71 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
99. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a discussion of the Griswold decision, see Ka-
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be an unconstitutional intrusion on the privacy of married
couples. The majority found that the first amendment "has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion."")()
Given the amorphous nature of penumbral rights, other justices have looked instead to the concept of "ordered liberty" as
the framework for privacy protection. In Rochin v. California,10 1 a
case involving involuntary stomach pumping, Justice Frankfurter
tin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The Justices and Connecticut's "Uncommonly Silly Law,
42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 680 (1967).
100. 381 U.S. at 483. The Griswold majority took notice of a broad range of
protections that, although not expressly addressed in the Constitution, have
been enforced judicially as within the spirit of the first amendment. Id. at 482.
Specifically, the Court characterized the rights to freedom of association and
privacy in one's associations as peripheral first amendment rights. Id. at 483.
Specific guarantees in the third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments likewise
were held to be sources of the penumbral protections of privacy in relation to
one's home or person, because without specific practical applications the express guarantees would be meaningless. Id. at 484-86. The Court concluded
that the right of married couples to use contraceptives encompassed several fundamental constitutional rights of privacy, and therefore merited protection. Id.
at 485-86.
Although he agreed with the majority's aversion to Connecticut's anti-contraceptive law, Justice Black objected strenuously to the Griswold majority's creation of a constitutional right of privacy. Id. at 508-10 (Black, J., dissenting). He
feared that the ambiguity inherent in a term such as "privacy" would be extended to cover any and all imagined offenses against personal dignity. Id.
In spite ofJustice Black's objection, this concept is now generally accepted,
although his fear of imprecision and expansion of the right has been borne out
to a certain extent. A constitutional privacy right has been found to embrace
broadly disparate interests, resulting in far-reaching privacy protections. See,
e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right to choose to live
with non-immediate members of one's family notwithstanding zoning ordinance
to the contrary); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to procure an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to buy contraceptives);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess obscene materials in
one's own home); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 301, 292
N.Y.S.2d 514 (1968) (unauthorized wiretapping and eavesdropping by mechanical means constitute cause of action for invasion of privacy), aJf'd, 25 N.Y.2d
560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1969). While imprecision as to the
exact source and scope of the right continues, a right to privacy Under the aegis
of at least one amendment to the Constitution is firmly established.
Early versions of a constitutional right of privacy Were recognized by the
Supreme Court even before Griswold. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) (right not to have one's stomach forcibly pumped by police looking for
criminal evidence); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (avoidance of
state-mandated sterilization of certain felons); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (parental right to direct children's upbringing prevents state
from mandating attendance at public school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (right to have children taught foreign language that was challenged as
inimical to national interest).
101. 342 U.S. 165 (1953). For a discussion of the Rochin decision, see
Comment, Use oflllegally Obtained Evidence and Due Process of Law, 50 Micu. L. RE'.
1367 (1952).
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invoked the ordered liberty theory developed in an earlier procedural due process case.' 0 2 He found that some personal rightsin Rochin, the right not to have one's bodily integrity violated in a
manner that "shocked the conscience"-are so fundamental that
they are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 0 3 These
rights are thus entitled to constitutional protection even without
explicit supportive language in the Constitution. 11 4 Not surprisingly, courts and commentators have had difficulty finding a satisOne
factory construct to explain "privacy" jurisprudence.
commentator called "privacy" interests an "unrelated bag of
goodies."h) 5 Other writers have organized privacy decisions into
taxonomies of interests such as "repose, sanctuary, and intimate
decision";"'" "self-fulfillment, non-conformity, and dignified
treatment by government agencies"; 10 7 and "autonomy and inti'' 1
macy.""
The Supreme Court itself has attempted to categorize
personal privacy into discrete subject areas that include marital
intimacies, home, family, child-rearing, and procreation. 9 This
102. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). In Palko, Justice Cardozo found the prohibition against double jeopardy to be not so fundamental as
to warrant protection against state action. Id. at 328. While this specific holding
has since been overturned, the notion of ordered liberty has survived. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (overturning Palko).
103. 342 U.S. at 169, 172.
104. Justice Black, in an opinion anticipating his Griswold dissent, decried
the notions of "ordered liberty" and "fundamental rights" as judicial subjectivis. I.at 174-77 (Black,J, concurring). Although he concurred in the result in
Rochiin, justice Black observed that derivation of rights from judicial predictions
not only would produce disparate results but also could lead to an eventual dilution of the federal guarantees themselves. Id. at 177 (Black, J., concurring).
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), a decision made 25
years after Rochin, the notion of "ordered liberty" appeared again as the preferred theory for dissenting Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and White. There, Justice White stated:
There are various "liberties" ... which require that infringing legislation 1here, a restrictive zoning ordinance.] be given closer judicial
Interests such as] the right of association, the right to
scrutiny....
vote, and various claims sometimes referred to under the general rubric
of the right to privacy . . .weigh very heavily against state claims of
authority to regulate. It is this category of interests which MR. JUSTICE
STEWARr refers to as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Id. at 548-49 (White, J., dissenting).
105. Thomson, The Right of Privac', 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295 (1978).
106. Note, A47axonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctumy and Intimate Derision, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (1976).
107. Note, Toward a Constitutional Theore of Individnality." The Privacy Opinions
ojinstice Douglas, 87 YALE L.J. 1579, 1588 (1978).
108. Gerety, Redefining Privay, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REX'. 233, 268 (1977).
109. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (family); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (procreation).
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reduction of privacy to a common denominator of home life or
intimate family choices may be a reflection of the predilections of
the Justice who is writing, or of the particular subject matter of
the case, rather than a true characterization of privacy jurisprudence. Because privacy continues to be an umbrella term for a
variety of interests, attempts to categorize it generally do not contribute to a substantive understanding of the constitutional parameters of the right to privacy. However, Justice Stevens'
delineation of the informational privacy interest in Whalen v.
Roe' ' is helpful in analyzing the scope of the right of privacy in
the context of medical research.
In Whalen, physicians and patients challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring the registration of the
names of all patients who had prescriptions for certain legal but
potentially abusable drugs."' The plaintiffs claimed that a patient identification program of this sort would both infringe upon
their personal privacy and have a chilling effect on their pursuit of
needed medical assistance.
The Court began its discussion by identifying two sets of interests. The first set, represented by the Griswold line of cases,
centered around autonomy in intimate, personal, or familial decision-making.' 12 These cases are the source of commentators' categorization of privacy into areas labeled intimate decision-making
autonomy, human dignity, and the like.' 13 The second set of
identifiable interests, labeled "informational privacy," focused
upon disclosure of personal matters, in particular, disclosure that
might adversely affect one's reputation or relations in the
community. ' 14
The Whalen Court determined that the plaintiffs' claims were
based on informational privacy, but found such claims unwarranted because of the sheer number of prescriptions filled each
110. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
111. Id. at 591. These drugs included opium, cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and methaquaalones, drugs prescribed for conditions varying from heroin addiction to migraine headaches. Id. at 593 n.8.
112. For a discussion of Griswold, see supra notes 99-100 and accompanying
text.
113. For a discussion of commentators' categorization of privacy, see slipra
notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (invasion of privacy
resulting from the dissemination of a congressional report on the Washington,
D.C., school system that included identification of students in a derogatory
context).
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month among the general state population." 5 In addition, the
Court reasoned that no one had been deprived completely of the
choice to use the needed medication because the drugs were not
prohibited and because patients did not have to face any additional bureaucracy to obtain them.' 16 As a result, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs' interest in freedom from disclosure was
insufficient to override the state's interest in the control of drug
abuse.
The Court dealt with the plaintiffs' informational privacy interest in Whalen in the context of concern for disclosure of information in the drug records. It found that the mere collection of
patients' names did not constitute "disclosure" because the information was accessible only to proper persons.' 17 Noting that
public disclosure could have occurred in Whalen had state employees violated the statute's security provisions, the Court regarded
disclosures to state employees administering the program, hospital personnel, insurance companies, and public health agencies as
unpleasant but essential intrusions on privacy. The Court concluded that as long as a statute or regulation that mandates these
"normal" disclosures as part of modern medical practice contains
appropriate safeguards against unwarranted disclosure, a state
need go no further in protecting individual privacy.' II
The factual setting of the case undoubtedly played a role in
the Whalen Court's evaluation of the freedom from disclosure.
Drug abuse is a major social problem requiring stringent measures of control. As a result, states have a strong and legitimate
115. 429 U.S. at 598. This reasoning is something of a non sequitur in
constitutional privacy jurisprudence. That other people fill their prescriptions
(foes not mean that the complaining parties are not deprived of their constitutional right to make personal decisions free of the state's shadow. Perhaps the
Court regarded this claim as makeweight or at least as insufficient to outweigh a
state interest in data collection for prevention of drug abuse.

116. Id. at 603. Again, its reasoning suggests that the Court may not have
regarded the privacy claim in Jlialen as a serious one. The Court noted that the
state has broad policy power to regulate the administration of drugs by the medical profession, within which choices may be exercised by patients in consultation
with a physician. Id. at 603 n.30. The Court refused to place much weight on
the evidence in the record that a chilling effect had in fact occurred and that
some patients were forgoing medication due to fear of the data collection program. The Court's reference to the absence of additional bureaucracy impeding
patient access to drugs suggests that the state's relatively passive system of patient data collection would not trigger strict judicial scrutiny of the statute. See
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Court held additionai bureaucracy to be
unconstitutional impediment to women's abortion choice).
117. 429 U.S. at 600-02.
118. Id. at 605-06.
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interest in controlling illicit drug traffic. The Court determined
that New York's law was reasonable in light of its purpose.I ' The
Court left open, however, the possibility that in other situations a
higher standard might be applied. 20 It emphasized that it had
119. Id. at 605. In Whalen, the Court used a different standard from the one
generally used to evaluate the propriety of the challenged conduct. The Court
evaluated the state interest using the reasonableness standard rather than strict
scrutiny. Id. at 597-98. Reasonableness is not the standard ordinarily invoked
to evaluate state laws when a "fundamental right" such as privacy is implicated;
rather, the strict scrutiny standard is employed. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (zoning ordinance); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(abortion law); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state contraceptive ban). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. The Court's application of the less stringent standard in Whalen may
have been due to the specific factual setting, including both the relative remoteness of the threat of damaging disclosures and the state's interest in an area of
enormous social concern. Alternatively, the Court may have rejected the strict
scrutiny standard because it did not consider informational privacy to be a fundamental right.
Justices Brennan and Stewart, in separate concurring opinions, articulated
two possible interpretations of the Court's view of whether the right to freedom
from disclosure was a fundamental right. Although both justices agreed with the
Court's basic holding, Justice Brennan believed that the Court had recognized
an individual's interest in avoiding sensitive disclosure as an aspect of the right
of privacy. 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, on the
other hand, felt that the Court had not recognized such a right. Id. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated that he would require the state to
demonstrate a compelling interest if it deprived persons of their right to avoid
public disclosure of private information. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart, finding that no such right existed, implicitly presumed any reasonable state interest would be sufficient. Id. at 609 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Although Justice Brennan's approach is more consistent with the majority's own
reasoning, Justice Stewart's view demonstrates the possibility that informational
privacy is not a fundamental constitutional right at all.
120. 429 U.S. at 605-06. Justice Stewart's reasonableness approach, however, was favored in several subsequent lower court decisions. See Barry v. City
of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983); Fadjo v.
Coon, 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). Notably, in Plante, the Fifth Circuit
indicated that the disclosure requirements of Florida's Sunshine Amendment
did not necessarily implicate fundamental rights, and it declined to use a strict
scrutiny standard. 575 F.2d at 1134. See FLA. CONsT. art. 2, § 8 (requiring certain elected officials to make public details of their personal finances). Instead,
the court chose a variation of the reasonableness test, cautioning that the test
required more than a showing of mere rationality. 575 F.2d at 1134. Furthermore, the court noted the Supreme Court's warning "against giving heightened
attention to cases involving new 'fundamental interests.' " Id. (citing San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
An even more cautious posture was adopted in a 1981 Sixth Circuit decision, where the court contended that the Supreme Court recognized no general
right to nondisclosure of private information. J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080
(6th Cir. 1981). Adopting the language of a 1976 Supreme Court decision, the
DeSanti court maintained that the only constitutionally protected privacy interests were those that were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," or "funda-
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not reached the question of "unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data ...

by a system that did not contain [a security

provision]."' '2- As a result, similar statutes reflecting strong state
interests could be subjected to strict scrutiny and possible invalidation under the fourteenth amendment in the event of public
revelation of sensitive private data and in the absence of a mechanism for screening the data's dissemination.
Two other cases, Paul v. Davis '2 2 and California Bankers Association v. Schultz,' 123 suggest that a state's interest in law enforcement
is a strong factor in the Supreme Court's balancing of personal
against societal interests. In Paul, plaintiff Davis was a newspaper
photographer who had been arrested but never convicted for
shoplifting in Louisville. Davis' name and photograph appeared
on an "active shoplifters" flier that the city police chief's office
had circulated to shopkeepers. 1 24 Davis sued the police chief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983125 for defamation and deprivation of his
constitutional right to privacy. Writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist found that mere damage to reputation without injury
mental." Id. at 1090 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). It distinguished
It'halen and another Supreme Court case on the grounds that neither case explicitly recognized a constitutional right of confidentiality, citing Justice Stewart's
concurring opinions to this effect. Id. at 1088-89 (citing Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 484 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). The
DeSanti court criticized the liberal interpretation given Whalen and NVixon by other
circuit courts in Rado, IVestinghouse, and Plante, and it challenged the indiscriminate use of the balancing test. Id. at 1088, 1090. The court reiterated, however,
that the disclosure of private information could attain constitutional protection
if fundamental rights were implicated. Id. at 1090-91. Cf Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (corporation's constitutionally
protected privacy interest compelled district court to reinstate the seal on 3800
pages of deposition transcript never used at trial).
For other cases addressing the right of privacy that follow Whalen, see Doe
v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1978); Louisiana Chem. Ass'n v. Bingham, 550 F. Supp. 1136 (W.D. La.
1982), aff'd per curiam, 731 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1984); Lona v. New York City Bd.
of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Volkman v. Miller, 52 A.D.2d 146, 383
N.Y.S.2d 95, aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 946, 363 N.E.2d 355, 394 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1977);
Wisconsin ex rel. Pflaum v. Wisconsin Psychological Examination Bd., 111 Wis.
2d 643, 331 N.W.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1983).
121. 429 U.S. at 605-06.
122. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
123. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
124. 424 U.S. at 696-97. The dissent noted that the flier was distributed 17
months after Davis had been arrested, "proclaiming that the individuals identified by name and picture were 'subjects knowin to be active in this criminal field' "
of shoplifting. Id. at 719-20 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). According to the dissent, there was no justification for branding Davis a criminal
because no trial had occurred. Id. at 718-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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to one's employment or other economic interest was insufficient
to sustain a claim of deprivation of a due process "liberty" interest.' 2" This rather harsh result appears to have hinged on the
Court's fear that any other outcome would open the Civil Rights
Act to abusive and frivolous claims against state authority. The
holding was also supported by the Court's determination that a
mere reputational interest was insufficient to trigger due process
"liberty" guarantees. Rejecting Davis' claim that his right to privacy had been violated, the Court asserted that "disclosure of the
fact of his arrest on a shoplifting charge" did not implicate the
type of fundamental right that had been recognized in the Roe v.
Wade 12 7 line of decisions that had begun with Griswold. '28 With
this stance, the Court essentially discounted its previous recogni129
tion of informational privacy interests.
In his dissent in Paul,Justice Brennan focused on the majority's discussion of the Civil Rights Act, asserting that the Court's
privacy holding was not necessary.13 0 He chastized the majority
for introducing the right of privacy into consideration only to re126. 424 U.S. at 698-99, 706-10. Justice Rehnquist cited several cases involving the stigmatization of government employees who had lost their jobs in
the 1950s because government officials had branded them "subversives." Id. at
705 (citing Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (Civil Service Commission's
Loyalty Review Board, acting on its own motion in removing and barring employee from federal service, went beyond its jurisdiction); Weiman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952) (Oklahoma law denying employment solely on basis of organizational membership violated due process clause since it classified innocent
with knowing association); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951) (suit for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by organizations
designated as communist on Loyalty Review Board list should not have been
dismissed for failure to state claim)). These cases do not stand for the general
proposition that the due process clause may not be expanded to protect federal
employees from the loss of their jobs. While the result in the cases appears
somewhat heavy-handed when applied to the facts of Paul, it is difficult to match
the federal government's interest in non-communist employees with Louisville's
campaign against shoplifting.
127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
128. 424 U.S. at 712-13. The Court apparently disregarded the dissent's
point that the flier asserted Davis was an active criminal, thus confusing arrest
with proven guilt. Justice Brennan, for himself and two other dissenters, wrote a
stinging rebuke of the Court's cavalier treatment of the American criminal justice system's presumption of innocence. Id. at 714-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. In Whalen, the majority had characterized the reputational interest in
Paul as only one of "at least two" sets of privacy interests, the other being an
interest in avoiding the disclosure of intimate personal data. 429 U.S. at 599,
600 n.26. For a discussion of these characterizations in [I'halen, see supra notes
110-14 and accompanying text.
130. 424 U.S. at 714-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a further discussion
of Justice Brennan's dissent, see supra notes 124-28.
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ject it Without ever offering any real analysis of the right.',
Justice Brennan also expressed his fear that, as a result of the
majority's holding in Paul, the doctrines cited in a series of recent
state and federal decisions based on privacy notions and involving
circumstances favoring limits on the power of government to disseminate unresolved arrest records would "never have the oppor'3 2
tunity for full growth and analysis."'
Another Supreme Court case, California Bankers Association v.
Schultz' 33 undercuts Justice Stevens' recognition in Whalen of a
privacy right based on freedom from disclosure of embarrassing
information. In California Bankers, banks and their clients challenged the constitutionality of record-keeping provisions of the
Bank Secrecy Act of 197013 4 as violating depositors' right to privacy. The Act requires banks to maintain records of customers'
identities and photocopies of customers' checks for any domestic
transactions over $10,000, which in turn can be utilized in criminal, tax, and regulatory proceedings. 13 5 Taking a balancing approach and relying heavily on the state's interest, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found the law enforcement
objectives of the Act to be a proper exercise of congressional
power that did not impinge on a protected interest.'i The Court
found that the plaintiffs, including depositors and the American
Civil Liberties Union, had brought the suit prematurely because
no disclosures that might threaten their privacy interests had occurred. The banks themselves were found not to have an unrestricted right to keep transaction- confidential, and thus their
privacy claim failed on the merits.1- 7 Once again, state interests
were deemed to outweigh the right to privacy from disclosure.
CaliforniaBankers, like Whalen and Paul, included dissents supporting the privacy claims. Justice Douglas questioned the "big
131. 424 U.S. at 735 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 735 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Utz v. Cullinane, 520
F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Tarlton v.Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Menard v.Mitchell,
328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), revd on othergrounds, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir.
1974); United States v. Kadish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967); Davidson v. Dill,
180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972); Eddy v.Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d
211 (1971).
133. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
134. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (then codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959 (1970)); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083,
1101- 1105, 1121-1122 (1970)).
135. 12 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1982); 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1982).
136. California Bankers, 416 U.S. at 46, 53-54.
137. Id. at 66.
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brother" quality of the Act and found a serious threat to bank
customers' legitimate expectations of privacy, especially because
one's financial transactions reflect one's protected beliefs, ideas,
and associations. 3 8 The Douglas dissent, along with those by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, expressed concern that the majority's blanket approval of broad record-keeping reflected an illogical assumption that all bank depositors are imminent law
breakers. The dissenters deplored the seizure of personal data
occasioned by the record-keeping requirement as a sweeping violation of the fourth amendment. 139 These dissents reflect the dilemma of the Court as it attempts to achieve a workable balance
between individual rights of privacy and the state interest in maintaining personally identifiable data.
When the Court attempts to evaluate the constitutionality of
the disclosure of intimate data regarding an individual, it evaluates three interrelated factors: the importance of the state's interest, the strength of the plaintiff's claims, and the degree of
protection the privacy right should be afforded against the disclosure of intimate data.
In the extreme situation, an individual's interests in protecting his or her reputation from ruin, in maintaining the secrecy of
financial records and all of the personal information that they
contain, and in keeping the use of strong medication confidential,
are no match for the state's interest in prevention and detection
of crime. However, in less extreme cases, there remains a large
area in which differing results might be reached. For example,
were it not the state but a research team that wanted access to
sensitive patient data, the state interest might be viewed as less
significant, although deference to the exigencies of "modern
medical practice" mentioned in Whalen 141 could allow a court to
reject any claim of privacy invasion. At the present time, the cases
give no clear indication of whether a state's interest in the advancement of medical knowledge is as strong as its interest in law
enforcement. 141
138. Id. at 82-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In his concurrence, Justice Powellwarned that if the Bank Secrecy Act had provided for stringent record-keep-

ing for the whole banking population, and not just for those with transactions in
amounts greater than $10,000, he would have recognized a constitutional privacy interest. Id. at 78-79 (Powell,J., concurring).
139. Id. at 82-97 (Douglas, Brennan, MarshallJ.J., dissenting).
140. 429 U.S. at 602.
141. In a 1980 decision, the Sixth Circuit did enforce a subpoena issued by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to obtain medical
records of a company's employees on file in the plant physician's office in order
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With respect to the importance of the privacy interest involved, there are strong similarities between the plaintiffs' interests in Whalen and Paul14 2 and the interest of patients in the
nondisclosure of their medical histories. As has been documented in the Privacy Commission Report 143 and at least one
other government-funded study, 14 4 individuals whose medical
records have reached potential employers, insurance companies,
or other third parties have suffered losses of employment opportunities, setbacks in medical treatment, and other detrimental effects because of the revelation of erroneous, misunderstood, or
embarrassing information contained in their files. Similarly, the
aggrieved parties in Whalen and Paul feared social opprobrium
and job insecurity; in Whalen some even avoided medical treatment for fear of disclosure or stigmatization. The Supreme Court
has indicated that such interests are not protected so long as
there is a sufficient countervailing state interest and adequate security provisions regulating data collection and use.
A dictum in Whalen, however, modifies this conclusion. The
Court stated that as long as informational privacy, that is, an expectation of freedom from unwarranted disclosure of personal
data, remains an accepted and viable aspect of the constitutional
right to privacy, a plaintiff may have a cause of action for unwarranted revelation of personal information.' 45 In the medical research context, such a claim could arise where medical records
are left unsecured in such a way that nonresearch personnel can
peruse them, or where records are deliberately disclosed to persons outside of the research team. A patient's cause of action also
could arise either where the hospital or doctor neglects to establish proper security or where the users of the medical data violated the existing security procedures. A patient would first have
to demonstrate that compensable injury, such as economic or job
to aid research into skin diseases suffered by employees working in the "wet
rubber" process. The court held that the subpoena did not infringe upon the
zone of privacy interest protected by the Constitution. General Motors Corp. v.
Director of Nat'l Inst. for Occupational Safety and Health, 636 F.2d 163 (6th
Cir. 1980). See also In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Wis. 1980); E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea, 442 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. W. Va. 1977).
142. For discussions of Whalen and Paul, see supra notes 110-32 and accompanying text.
143. For a discussion of the Privacy Commission Report, see supra note 4
and accompanying text.
144. See A. WESTIN, supra note 4.
145. 429 U.S. at 605-06.
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loss, resulted from the revelation. 14" General damages for loss of
reputation or other personal embarrassment, as well as punitive
damages for intentional acts causing harm, could then be
asserted.
Taken together, Whalen, Paul, and California Bankers suggest
that although private data can be collected for a legitimate purpose, its dissemination must be safeguarded so as to prevent
broad public revelation or exposure to casual outsiders. Such
protection for data collection no doubt applies to medical records
as well. Patients' medical histories, after all, are at least as sensitive as their financial transactions.' 4 7 It remains unclear, however, exactly how significant a role the need for such protection
will play in the Court's balancing process.
Constitutional support for a right to privacy has been asserted in Supreme Court decisions for half a century. However,
the issue has been ensnared in a philosophical debate in which
both the existence and scope of the right have been questioned.
Because of this, the Court has employed an after-the-fact balancing of interests, making it difficult to predict the strength of privacy protection in a given situation. While this balancing
approach may provide for flexibility in judicial opinions, it does
not assure individuals any consistent personal privacy protection.
The analysis offered by Justice Stevens in Whalen is helpful, but in
view of the decisions in Paul and California Bankers, hardly determinative. In sum, although constitutional doctrine does provide
some insight into the problem of privacy protection, it offers few
solutions to the issues raised by the use of medical records in scientific research.
3.

Statutory Protections

Because issues involving intrusions of privacy are currently
receiving a great deal of legislative attention, recently enacted
statutes dealing with the subject provide useful guidelines for understanding the current state of privacy law in the area of medical
research. However, although a number of state statutes recognize the right of privacy, most apply only to the commercial exploitation of one's name or image. For example, the New York
Civil Rights Law provides only minimum protection for the indi146. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
147. For example, the Whalen Court acknowledged the potential damage
that could occur from a security breach revealing legitimate drug use by patients. 429 U.S. at 600-01.
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vidual, merely prohibiting the exploitation by a commercial enterprise of an individual's name or visage for profit without his or
her consent. 148 Other privacy statutes are modeled after the New
York statute, 41 suggesting that they are likely to be interpreted in
a similarly narrow manner. More recently, federal and state privacy statutes have been extended in order to control consumer
credit reporting agencies 15 and financial institutions.' 5 ' State
legislation that would apply to institutions such as hospitals,
whether or not they receive public funding, or to practicing medi5 2
cal personnel, remains almost entirely in the proposal stage.'
148. N.Y. Civ. RIGHrs LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976).

Section 50 provides:

A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes,
or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living
person without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Id. This statute afforded no protection to the plaintiff in Doe v. Roe because the
psychiatrist had not commercialized the plaintiff's likeness. 93 Misc. 2d 201,
211-12, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (Sup. Ct. 1977). The court, however, did find a
cause of action for privacy invasion, derived from public policy and statutes. Id.
149. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1-.3 (West 1983); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-216.1 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-405 (1978) (repealed 1981).
150. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982) (procedure governing records maintained on individuals by agencies of executive branch or any independent regulating agency). Some states have enacted similar legislation. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 4-190 (West 1984) (procedure governing personal data maintained
by state agencies); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-377 to -386 (1979 & Supp. 1984) (Privacy
Protection Act of 1976) (procedural safeguards over state and local record-keeping agencies).
151. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 380 to 380-r (McKinnev 1984) (Fair
Credit Reporting Act), reprinted in PRIVACY, A PUBLIC CONCERN: A RESOURCE
DOCUMENT (K.S. Larsen ed. 1975) (Appendix XI) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY,
A PUBLIC CONCERN]. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-420 (1980) (procedures protecting confidentiality of examination reports and records of Arkansas State
Bank Department); CAL. Gov"r CODE §§ 7460-7493 (West 1976) (amending
§§ 10145, 10146 of the Business and Professions Code, repealing § 1917 of the
Financial Code, and amending the Government, Insurance and Vehicle Code)
(procedures for governmental access to confidential information between financial institutions and their customers); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 655.057 (West 1984)
(restrictions on public access to private financial records); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
6, §§ 2201-2206 (West 1984) (Financial Privacy Act); PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 489-95.
152. See PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, slipra note 4, at 491-92. The report
notes that while various states have statutes granting patients a right of access to
their medical records, or regulating disclosure of medical data, there is little
comprehensive state legislation in existence. Id. In response, the Privacy Commission advised that states enact their own statutes incorporating the protection
for medical records recommended by the Commission so that individuals would
not have to rely on the federal government to enforce the rights established by
the Commission's recommended measures and so that the recommended rights
and obligations could be extended to public and private medical care providers
who do not need to qualify for Medicare or Medicaid participation. Id. at 493.
Two states, Montana and Rhode Island, recently have enacted legislation
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Among the various state legislative efforts, California's Information Practices Act of 1977' 5 3 comes closest to approximating
the spirit of what the Privacy Commission contemplated. 154 Typical of such state legislation, this statute affirms a right of privacy
as a "personal and fundamental right protected by ...the Consti55
tution of California and by the United States Constitution."']
The California statute recognizes that an individual's right of privacy is directly affected by the kind of disclosure and use made of
identifiable information about him in a record.' 56 In particular,
the law acknowledges the danger that data misuse poses to the
data subject's employment, insurance, and credit opportunities;
and to preservation of his or her due process rights. 5 7 Where it
applies, the statute requires written consent of the data subject as
58
a prerequisite to disclosure of pertinent record information.
California's law could be applied easily to medical research
data. "Personal information" as defined in the statute explicitly
includes records of medical treatment among the protectable
data. 159 Furthermore, California's law would appear to apply to a
hospital and its institutional review board. In this respect, the bill
differs from other legislation because its application is not limited
to "agencies" but applies broadly both to organizations, however
organized, and to natural persons.'"6°
The general purpose of the California statute is to prohibit
nonconsensual disclosure of persoiial information. There are,
however, several troublesome exceptions to the prohibition that
substantially could prevent the law's application to medical record research and could render patient data vulnerable to an engoverning the confidentiality of medical records. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 5016-301 to -314 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-37.3-1 to -11 (Supp. 1984). The
Montana statute governs: when consent is required to release or transfer confidential health care information; when a third party such as an insurance cornpany may transfer confidential health care information to the physician of an
affected person; and when an affected person may expunge any part of medical
information that he believes is inerror, or request the addition of relevant information. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-16-312 to -314 (1983). The Rhode Island statute is very similar.
153. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798-1798.76 (West 1985).
154. For a discussion of the Privacy Commission Report, see supra note 4.
155. CAl.. CiV. CODE § 1798.1 (West 1985).
156. See PRIVACY, A PUBLIC CONCERN, SlU/f(l note 160, ai 42-60 (presenting
sample legislation from California, Michigan, and Minnesota and a model bill
from the National Association of State Information Systems).
157. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1798.1 (West 1985).
158. Id. § 1798.24(b).
159. Id. § 1798.3(b).
160. Id. § 1798.3(d).
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terprising researcher.'" One such exception is the apparent
automatic availability of information to a recipient who has given
advance written assurance that the subject of the information will
not be identified and that the information will be used solely in
research. In accordance with the Privacy Commission's recom-

mendations on medical records,'" 2 California exempted disclosure "[t]o a person who has provided the agency with advance
adequate written assurance that the information will be used
solely for statistical research or reporting purposes, but only if the
information to be disclosed is in a form that will not identify any
individual." - A second exception to the disclosure prohibition
operates when there is a showing of compelling circumstances af164
fecting the health or safety of a data subject.
These blanket exceptions for two broadly defined categories
of research

are

not

sufficiently

sensitive

to

individualized

problems. When individual contact with selected patients is proposed, a researcher may require patient identification; the burdens imposed by the California statute may hinder seriously the
researcher's ability to conduct that research. Similarly, the exemption requiring "compelling" circumstances opens a wide
range of issues. Although "compelling" is not defined in the law,
the exception could be interpreted to include all research intended to render further medical treatment to the data subject.
Arguably, most research falls within this exception. Once a researcher has demonstrated a "compelling" need to contact a subject, he or she will be afforded ready access to records. The
researcher's only obligation is to notify the patient once there has
been disclosure. As such disclosure can now be made with legislative sanction, records actually may become more readily available to researchers than before passage of the law.
On the federal level, the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy
Act)'165 recognizes a constitutional right to personal privacy, but
applies only to agencies within the executive branch of the government.'"" The reason for this limitation is that the Privacy Act
was designed primarily to inhibit federal agencies from abusing
their legitimate duties of collection, maintenance, use, and dis161. This vulnerability results, in part, from the lack of actual monitoring of
the researcher's compliance with statutory confidentiality protections.
162. See PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORr, supra note 4, at 306-07.
163. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.24(h) (West 1985).
164. Id. § 1798.24(i).

165. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
166. Id. § 5 5 2a(e).
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semination of individually identifiable data. 16 7 The Privacy Act
was an afterthought to the Freedom of Information Act.'16 After
enacting a law that was to open government operations to public
view, Congress became concerned that a great deal of personal
information regarding citizens that was collected by federal agencies would become available for public scrutiny. Congress responded with the Privacy Act in order to give individuals some
169
control over the government's data.
Most of the provisions of the Privacy Act address concerns
that are dealt with elsewhere in privacy law. For example, nonconsensual disclosure is prohibited in the Privacy Act by the same
language that appears in California's statute, with identical exemptions for statistical research and compelling health circumstances.' 70 Additional sections of the Privacy Act deal with
agency requirements and rules peculiar to government-related
matters.171 An agency head, for example, has the power to promulgate exemptions to certain subsections of the Privacy Act.
These discretionary exemptions relate to keeping an accounting
of disclosures, granting individuals access to their own records,
and seeking only information relevant to the statutory purposes
of research projects. While such exemptions would seem to dilute the Privacy Act's original goal, the agency-promulgated exemptions apply only if the records will be used in law
enforcement investigations or investigations for employment eligibility.' 72 As a result, a hospital or federally funded research
167. The Privacy Commission, created by the Privacy Act, recommended in
its mid-1977 report that the Privacy Act be revised to clarify ambiguities but that
it "nol be extended in its present form to organizations outside the Federal governinent," recognizing that states, in conjunction with input from the private
sector, should initiate further privacy legislation. PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 4, at 497 (emphasis in original).
168. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). The purpose of the Freedom of Information
Act is to assure public access to all government records the disclosure of which
would not significantly harm specific governmental interests. See Westchester
Gen. Hosp. v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 464 F. Supp. 236 (M.D.
Fla. 1979). See also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); Stokes

v.Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973); Luzaich v. United States, 435 F. Supp.
31 (D. Minn. 1977). For examples of state freedom of information acts, see DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 10001-10005 (1983); Michi. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.231.244 (West 1981).
169. See PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 504-05, 520.
170. For a discussion of California's privacy statute, see supra notes 153-64
and accompanying text.
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e), (0 (1982).
172. Id. § 552a(k).
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team could not take advantage of the exemptions unless its research were to be used for those purposes.
Although ostensibly the Privacy Act applies only to governmental agencies, its application could extend to a vast amount of
medical research in the private sector. First, the Privacy Act includes a provision concerning federal contractors that potentially
covers medical research conducted in hospitals. Section
552a(m)(1) specifies:
When an agency provides by a contract for the operation
by or on behalf of the agency of a system of records to
accomplish an agency function, the agency shall, consistent with its authority, cause the requirements of this
section to be applied to such system. For purposes of
subsection (i) of this section [regarding criminal penalties] any such contractor ... shall be considered to be an
73
employee of an agency. 1

Assuming that HHS funding for a medical research project renders the contracting hospital an "employee" of HHS, then the
research would become an "agency function" and would trigger
the Privacy Act, rendering the research and the system of information it generates subject to the Privacy Act's protections.
Moreover, the Privacy Commission has explicitly stated that
recipients of discretionary federal grants for research projects,
who were originally not thought to be "federal contractors,"
should have been included in the Privacy Act. 1 74 Thus, whether
the explicit language of the Privacy Act or the Privacy Commission's interpretation of it is used, hospitals and their IRB's are
apparently within its ambit.
California's Information Practices Act and the Federal Privacy Act share several premises. 17 5 The first is that there should
be no information system the very existence of which is secret.
Under the Privacy Act, each agency to which the Act applies must
publish an annual notice in the Federal Register detailing what information systems are being kept, categorizing the types of persons included, and listing the "routine uses" to be made of the
173. Id. § 552a(m)(1).

174. See id. § 552a(a)(1) (defining agency as in 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)). See also
Parsons, .1 Conmeat on the Privacy' Act of 1974, in
suna note 151, at 180 (Appendix XVII).

PRIVACY,

A

PUBLIC CONCERN,

175. Compare CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1798.1-76 (West 1985) with PRIVACY COMMISSION

REPORT, supra note 4, at 501.
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records. 171 California has a similar requirement of annual notice
to its Secretary of State.1 77 This "notice" then becomes a matter
of public record.
In practice, however, these openness requirements are of
limited utility to the average citizen. A system of information
generated by a medical records research project must contain
data retrievable by the patient's name or to her patient identification if it is to be subject to a state notice requirement. If patientidentifying information has been removed before a research team
obtains the records for research, the system of information its
project generates presumably would not come under the legislative requirements for notice. Moreover, even when formal notice
is given, actual disclosure depends entirely on the potential subject's individual initiative. He must discover on his own whether a
system of information of which he would be a likely subject has
been established.
Furthermore, increased patient access is important to ensure
accuracy of records. While it is the recordkeeper's duty-as the
statutes examined here explicitly require-to see to it that records
are accurate for their intended use,' 78 the records may contain
errors or may be incomplete. Complete accuracy in large record
systems may be impossible..
Closely related to this concern over patient access is an
awareness that a patient should be in a position to exert some
control over third-party access to intimate data.'7 This is a potential source of antagonism between patient and researcher.
The data's accuracy, after all, may not make the information any
less embarrassing or threatening to one's privacy. If a patient absolutely controls the access to his or her record, he or she may
176. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(A)-(D) (1982). Subsection (j), however, provides that notice need not be published if the data is being maintained tot law
enforcement purposes or for federal employment screening. Thus, health data
used to determine eligibility for a federal job may not be accessible to the data
subject.
177. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.9 (West 1985). Section 1798.9 provides in
pertinent part:
Each agency maintaining a system of records containing personal
or confidential information shall file with the Office of Information
Practices the notice specified in Section 1798.10. Stich notices shall be
filed with that office by such agencies on the first day of July of each
year. Stich notices shall be permanent public records.
Id.
178. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5), (6) (1982); CAL. Cty. CODE § 1798.18 (West
1985).
179. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.41 (West 1985) (disclosure of personal data
relating to others).
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forbid its use in research. A patient may refuse to permit access
because of a strongly held principle, the satisfaction of a whim, or
the fear of exposure of the record's information beyond the research team. The grant to an individual of the right to control the
access to intimate data implicates basic policy considerations
along with one's degree of commitment to independent medical
research.
Although the statutes provide for civil damages and other
remedies for failure to comply with access and disclosure provisions,18 1 1 the patient's control of access remains extremely limited.
Under both state and federal legislation, in order to recover, a
patient has to have suffered an "adverse effect."''
This term is
not defined, but the Supreme Court, in Whalen, Paul, and California Bankers, has indicated that such injury would have to take some
tangible, pecuniary form.18 2 Fear of social opprobrium or speculation as to loss of credit or employment opportunities probably
would not constitute an "adverse effect," nor would a claim that
the patient had foregone further medical treatment because of
embarrassment from the disclosure. Furthermore, as previously
noted, no written consent of the patient will be required when a
patient's identity has been expunged from a record or when a research team has demonstrated a compelling reason related to the
patient's health or safety for using identifiable information. In
such cases, a patient will have no power to refuse access to his or
83
her record.'
Statutory attempts to protect privacy are far from complete.
Even if medical records are within the general scope of the federal and state legislation described above, the statutes contain exemptions that could allow research to go forward without full
protection. In addition, the damage provisions do not seem to be
strong enough to deter wrongful disclosure.
C.

Conclusion

Privacy rights of subjects of biomedical research are not adequately protected by existing statutory and case law. In its pres180. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(l) (1982) (civil remedies); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.45 (West 1985) (civil actions against agencies).
181. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (1982); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.45(c) (West
1985).
182. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 110-39 and accompanying text.
183. For a discussion of these exceptions to patient protections, see supra
notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
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ent state, the law lacks the uniformity and certainty required to
protect individuals' expectations of privacy and confidential communications. Constitutional theory, another potential source of
protection, has also failed to respond to these needs, perhaps because a court is not the proper forum in which to balance the
need for individual protection against the needs of medical research. Accordingly, existing standards provide neither adequate
guidance for, nor sufficient protection to patients and researchers. A strong and comprehensive position is needed. This position should create a clear right to privacy in this context and at
the same time recognize that there may be situations in which privacy protection has to yield to other needs of society.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION

The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
(President's Commission), directed to study the privacy interest
of patients, 18 4 heard extensive testimony from witnesses on current and proposed mechanisms for ensuring the confidentiality of
patient medical records. 8 5 In its final report, the President's
Commission acknowledged the tension between the law and ethics of medical privacy and the need for detailed empirical exploration. The President's Commission recognized patients' need for
privacy in their medical records, but it also acknowledged the importance of these records in medical research and the continuing
needs of scientists to have access to them.'8 " In the end, however, the President's Commission provided no set of recommended statutory or administrative rules to resolve these
184. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 34-35. The enacting legislation directed the President's Commission to study "the ethical and
legal implications of current procedures and mechanisms designed (i) to safeguard the privacy of human subjects of behavioral and biomedical research,
(ii) to ensure the confidentiality of individually identifiable patient records, and
(iii) to ensure appropriate access of patients to information contained in such
records." Id. For a further discussion of the work of the President's Commission, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
185. A consultant, Professor William Winslade, was commissioned to prepare a report on the philosophical aspect of privacy and confidentiality of medical records. See W. Winslade, A Report on Privacy and Confidentiality in Health
Care (1982)(unpublished report). The report was presented to the President's

Commission in a hearing in March, 1982. See

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE

STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL ANIt BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDING:

MEETING

No. 18 (March 13, 1982) [here-

inafter cited as PROCEEDING TRANSCRIPT].

186.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT,

supra note 7, at 37.
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conflicts. Instead, the report merely encouraged health care
providers to give greater heed to privacy concerns.
In spite of the report's rather lenient approach, the need for
a regulatory construct in this area is of continuing urgency. The
following discussion proposes a model that attempts to balance
the conflicting interests in light of the principles and problems set
forth above.
As a necessary first step in protecting biomedical research
subjects from invasion of their privacy, a statute must clearly and
explicitly state that there is a right of privacy in medical information. 18 7 Such a statement should acknowledge expressly the patient's right to privacy with respect to information in his or her
medical records and the concomitant obligation of the doctor and
institution to protect such information from disclosure. This
would give the patient or subject-not the physician or institution-control over medical records, and make disclosure the exception rather than the rule.18 In the absence of such a statutory
expression, the clear enunciation of that right by the President's
Commission, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), or some other federal body could be an interim step. The
need for protection has been stated clearly by these bodies but
the full scope of the right has not been delineated. 1 :
Once this definitive principle has been established, a mechanism that would serve privacy interests and yet accommodate
medical research should be developed, either in a legislative or
regulatory format. Regulatory modification is an appropriate
method because it is flexible and builds on the model that already
has been established to balance a researcher's need for data
187. Professor Winslade's report recognizes the desirability of uniform and
comprehensive regulations, but stops short of proposing a federal statutory minimum. It suggests that the individual states may be "politically, pragmatically
and logically" best suited to implement regulations, guided by a national policy.
W. WINSLAnE, supra note 185, at 7.

188. It has been argued that the inadequacy of standards governing the disclosure of medical records is due to the patient's lack of collective representation. Physicians and researchers are represented by active lobbying groups;
patients "lack knowledge and power in this area." PROCEEDING TRANSCRIPT,
supra note 185, at 13. This conclusion may not be entirely fair to the medical
community. The American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and especially the American Medical Record Association do support
measures to protect patients' confidentiality, recognizing that if privacy concerns
are protected, the patient-physician relationship will be strengthened. W. WINSLADE, supra note 185, at 41.
189. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 37-38. See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409 (1984).
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against the potential for physical harm to the research subject. 190
The balancing function that has been used to evaluate issues involving physical harm could be used in a substantially similar
form to weigh and protect privacy interests.
Institutional review boards (IRBs) are ideally suited to perform this balancing function because they are set up to screen all
research proposals.' - ' Although current regulations emphasize
that the IRB's primary role is to balance the risk of physical harm
to a patient against society's need,' 92 a recognition of the patient's right to privacy protection simply would add another dimension to the IRB's analysis. This added dimension would not
require an IRB to change its function or its general practice. Regulations could be issued to amend and supplement the existing
HHS model used to control all biomedical and behavioral research approval today. The IRB would continue to apply a riskbenefit analysis in determining whether an individual research
protocol should proceed, and the present focus would be expanded to include privacy factors in deciding whether to approve
specific research requests. The imposition of this additional criterion will not overburden the IRB because the information needed
to analyze the privacy question is included in the information that
the IRB already receives.' 9 3 This proposal creates an additional
standard-patient privacy-and requires the IRB to apply that
standard in the same manner as the IRB applies the standard protecting the patient's physical welfare. Statutory or regulatory authority should thus require the IRB, created under HHS
authority, to assure a review of privacy rights and sufficient privacy protection in all research. The IRB will then become the
primary enforcement device for the protection of a patient's
privacy.
Once this new standard is imposed on the IRB, changes in
194
the current standard for informed consent should be made.
190. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)-(7) (1984) (criteria for IRB approval).
For a discussion of protection against physical harm, see supra text accompanying note 34.
19 1. Cowan & Adams, Ethical and Legal Considerations for IRB 's: Research with
Medical Records, IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, Dec. 1979, at 1,
3. For a discussion of the functions of IRB's, see supra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
192, 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 l(a)(2) (1984).
193. For a discussion of the IRB and the information it receives, see supra
notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
194. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1984) (providing general requirements for informed consent).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985

45

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 5 [1985], Art. 1

1122

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30: p. 1077

Typically, before an individual participates in a study, his or her
prior informed consent must be obtained. To obtain informed
consent, the researcher must first disclose to the patient or subject the potential risks to physical well-being and the potential
benefits accruing to the individual or to society, and then allow
the individual to make an independent decision. 19 5 As noted
above, however, informed consent becomes problematic where
research involving medical records is concerned because researchers often use records created long before the research design had been developed. In this type of research, appropriately
known as retrospective research, it may be difficult to locate the
individuals involved. 1'9 6 Similar problems exist with respect to
prospective research projects where the record is created during
the study. There, even though the subject is easily located, prior
consent is not really meaningful since the subject would not be in
a position to evaluate the potential risks to his or her well-being at
the time consent is given.' 9 7 There may be, however, a lesser
need to obtain informed consent to the release of information in
the context of medical records than in the context of physical experiments, inasmuch as a threat to privacy is usually less severe
than a threat to physical harm.
The IRB, therefore, should be required to approve research
access in all cases, but it should screen the cases to distinguish
between those in which individual consent is necessary and those
in which it is not. When consent is not required, the IRB should
then act to assure protection of the privacy interest of the patient
and set the terms and conditions of researcher access to patient
records.'9 8 In this way, personal privacy will be protected, but
the degree of protection will be responsive to the circumstances.
In those cases in which IRB protection alone would be sufficient,
necessary research will not be hindered by the need to obtain personal informed consent. Assuming, therefore, that the IRB can
utilize a screening device to distinguish between those cases in
which informed consent is needed and those in which it is not, the
essential task is to develop standards for the IRB to apply in making that distinction. 9 9 This involves a balancing of the potential
195. See id. § 46.116(a)(1)-(8) (1984) (basic elements of informed consent).
196. PROCEEDING TRANSCRIPT, supra note 185, at 101.
197. Id.
198. For a discussion of the criteria for IRB approval, see supra notes 20-27
and accompanying text.
199. See PROCEEDING TRANSCRIPT, supra note 185, at 107-09 (discussing
standards that should be applied and the situations in which they are needed).
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degree of harm to the individual endangered by the invasion of
his privacy against the benefits to society accruing from the antici200
pated medical research.
A.

Retrospective Review of Record

The initial question when addressing the review of records
created in the past is whether the subject can be located. 21 ' Often,
even if it is theoretically possible, the cost of a large-scale location
effort will make the effort prohibitively expensive, and its scale
will make it unduly difficult. 20 2 Accordingly, it is usually assumed
that individual consent is not necessary in this circumstance and
that IRB review alone will suffice. This assumption, however,
should not be applied in all cases; the requisite degree of review
will depend on the specifics of the studies. Individual subjects
can be divided into three distinct categories: (1) those persons
who will be identified in the study or who will be contacted by the
researchers on a follow-up basis; (2) those who, while not identified in the study, will have potentially damaging information revealed about themselves; and (3) those who will not be identified
in the study or contacted and as to whom only nondamaging or
benign information will be revealed.
Situations in which the individual will be identified in the
study or will be the subject of a follow-up interview present a relatively clear case. If the research involves a follow-up study in
which researchers will not only know the subject's identity, but
also will be dealing with him or her on a personal basis, there
exists a substantial risk to the individual's personal privacy, or at
least a substantial threat to the expectation of privacy that was
created when the original record was developed.2 0 3 In this situation, the initial cost justification for doing away with consent in
the retrospective review situation does not apply because the project design contemplates actual contact between the researcher
200. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 37.
201. PROCEEDING TRANSCRIPT, supra note 185, at 101.
202. An analogous balancing test was performed in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The Court in .lhlane recognized the cost of notifying multiple beneficiaries of a common trust fund whose
interests or addresses were unknown to the trustee. Id. at 319.
203. Professor Winslade indicates that the majority of patients may not realize the extent to which access to medical records can be legitimately gained by
third parties. W. WINSLADE, supra note 194, at 2. This may be increasingly true
as medical information is computerized and made available to a wide variety of
users. See generally Boyer, Computerized Medical Records and the Right to Privacy: 7e
Emerging Federal Response, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 37 (1975).
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and the subject. Thus, informed consent should not be circumvented; there is a significant threat to privacy and the subject can
be located easily. The researcher should be required to obtain
informed consent in all cases of this type.
In obtaining this consent, the investigator, whether in person

or by proxy, must explain to the subject the nature of the study
and the potential threat to the individual's expectation of confidentiality or protection of privacy before the subject's medical
records are perused or before he or she is contacted on a followup basis. 2 1 4 Only such an informed consent will protect the iden-

tified subject from violations of privacy.
The second category of individuals who might be involved in
a retrospective study are those who will not be identified or contacted, but about whom potentially damaging information can be
obtained. For example, research into whether individuals with
certain types of diseases abuse certain types of drugs, or whether
child abuse coincides with certain types of educational and familial background, falls into this category. Consent should be obtained for studies involving such "sensitive" information.
Although the individual in these instances may not be identifiable,
potentially embarrassing and sensitive information will be disseminated to researchers with whom the individual has not dealt
and over whom he or she has no control. Only the individual
involved can measure the effects of the disclosure on his or her
well-being. The only adequate protection, therefore, is to require
informed consent. Although this iequirement may impede research, the nature of the material in the record requires some
control on the part of the individual..2

5

11

Thus, in this situation the

researcher should fully inform the subject and obtain the subject's informed consent before access is had to the subject's medical records.
In the third situation, the patient is neither identified by the
study nor contacted during it. In addition, the information in the
file is benign and will cause no adverse consequences if released.
This type of material might refer to basic physical characteristics
and health information. Here, research should proceed without
individual consent, but only after IRB approval. The IRB should
204. Rosen, Signing Away Medical Privacy, 3 Civ. Li1. REv. 54, 59 (1976).
205. See Committee on Federal Legislation, Privacy of Medical Records, 35
REC. A.B. Crry N.Y. 488, 500 (1980) (supporting the Privacy Commission's recommendation to require a patient's consent in writing before any further use of
information about the patient is permitted).
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review the research protocol and require the investigator to provide procedural safeguards adequate to protect the subject's privacy interests. These safeguards should include removal of
names or identifying characteristics from research reports. Additionally, the IRB should require security measures to prevent unauthorized access. In this regard, the IRB would be performing
functions similar to those required of the state agency in Whalen v.
Roe. 20 6 The IRB, therefore, would function both as a patient consent surrogate2 0 7 and an experimental control mechanism.
While this proposal removes primary control of privacy from
the individual subject and places it upon the IRB, it adequately
protects the needs of the individual. The proposal permits medical research to proceed, but recognizes that each individual has a
right to privacy which the investigator must protect. The researcher's access without the subject's consent should be limited
to those situations in which either there is a very low risk of privacy invasion or it is practically impossible to contact large numbers of persons within reasonable time and cost constraints. With
respect to benign information about nonidentified subjects, this
approach incorporates a recognition of both the right of privacy
and the need for medical research to go forward where there is
little risk to the individual.
B.

Prospective Review of Record

Consent should be required routinely with respect to prospective record review because the practical impossibility argument for removing consent in the retrospective situation does not
apply. In these cases, the subject is in a position to give an authorization to the record custodian to release his or her records
for specific types of medical research. 2" 8 Requiring informed
consent in these cases also allows those people with a general
aversion to research to exclude themselves from the potential re206. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). For a discussion of Whalen, see supra notes 11018 and accompanying text.
207. The standard for surrogate consent was set out in Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974). There the Court held that a Louisiana sequestration statute that did not require the defendant to be notified prior to seizure of
property was constitutional. Id. at 619. The Court reasoned that because the
statute directed a judge to issue the order, required the filing of an affidavit
reciting details of the plaintiff's claimed right, and provided opportunity for a
post-trial hearing and for damages for wrongful sequestration, the defendant's
rights had not been abridged. Id. at 618.
208. This procedure would merely require a modification of the existing
practice of obtaining informed consent for physical risks.
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20 9
search pool.

While a consent form in prospective research cases will warn
the subject of the potential disclosure and use of his or her medical record, it may not be sufficient to ensure that the consent is
fully informed. At the time the record is being compiled, the subject may not know what information will be ultimately included in
the record or the content of the research plan in which that information eventually will be used.2" 1° In order to ensure that the individual granting consent is fully aware of the content of the
record, a separate consent form should be used at the end of each
treatment segment in the hospital or office. The individual who is
the subject of the record should be presented with his or her record, allowed to review it, and then permitted to sign a form authorizing access to information included in the record. The
individual also should have the opportunity to decline to participate altogether or to exclude some particular bit of information.
However, because an individual who grants a prospective consent
may not be fully aware in advance of the use to which the information will be put, the IRB should play an active role both to assess
the need for informed consent and to serve as a surrogate in
those circumstances in which actual informed consent prior to
21
each use of the information is not required. 1
In situations in which the research subject will be identified
or in which potentially sensitive or damaging information will be
revealed by the research process, there is no substitute for informed consent. A blanket authorization simply would be inadequate. The subject should consent specifically to the actual
research protocol on an individualized preresearch consent form.
209. Rosen, supra note 204, at 58. The President's Commission notes that

the patient's expectation of confidentiality is critical to the success of the physician-patient relationship. In many instances, the physician can obtain information necessary to effect treatment only if the patient believes that the
information will remain confidential.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORr, suprea

note 7, at 36. Winslade suggests that in addition to stricter disclosure standards,
patients ought to receive access to their records. Access to records would permit patients to ensure that the information contained in the records is accurate
and would foster the patient's sense of trust in the physician. See W. WINSLADE,
supra note 185, at 94 (discussing developments in the physician-patient relation-

ship and in the content of medical records).
210. The researcher may be equally unable to predict the ultimate content
of a patient's records. Were this not the case, a patient theoretically could be
fully informed and could give a sufficient and comprehensive consent at the outset of the research.
211. This function is essentially the same as that performed for retrospective research review. For a discussion of the IRB's function in retrospective research review, see supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
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The IRB should also require maximal protection in terms of research methodology. Thus, in cases of identified subject users
and sensitive information, the researcher should not be permitted
to hide behind a blanket authorization or a prior record consent
form.
With respect to situations in which the individual is not going
to be identified and will be the subject of benign disclosure, a
prior consent in the record should be sufficient, so long as the
IRB is convinced that the disclosure in the consent form adequately apprises the subject of the potentiality for inclusion in future research. If the IRB is so persuaded, consent in the record
will substitute for further IRB review of privacy interests. The
IRB, however, must still ensure that the records are subject to
controls and that the investigator meets his or her burden of protecting the confidentiality and the privacy of the research subject.
Thus, with respect to prospective record review, informed
consent will lessen the IRB's task because each potential research
subject will have the opportunity to make his or her own authorization. 2 12 Because this authorization takes place before the research does, however, it will still be necessary for the IRB to
review and classify research proposals. Finally, while research
with records to be created presents fewer difficulties for the IRB,
there are still sufficient problems to justify this proposal. A requirement for consent review at intervals may produce some additional work for the IRB, but it will ensure that individual
confidentiality will receive maximal protection without hindering
the progress of needed medical research.
V.

CONCLUSION

Today there is a strong and growing belief that an individual's personal history and private life should be subject to his or
her own disposition and control. While the doctrinal label and
the degree of protection may vary, there is a clear recognition
that unauthorized disclosure should be prevented. The use of
personal information contained in medical files in connection
with bio-medical and behavioral research is an important but inadequately protected facet of this more general problem of privacy. Although totally prohibiting the use of personal
212. A legal precedent for this consent requirement was established in
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1981). There
the court required that employees be notified of, and given an opportunity to
object to disclosure of their medical records.
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information contained in medical records would frustrate the advance of scientific research in many areas of important social concern, more can be done to protect the individual from potential
abuses. A mechanism that would protect an individual's privacy
and at the same time facilitate necessary bio-medical and behavioral research is needed. 21 3 The utilization of the institutional review board as a control and screening device would achieve this
end. The creation of this right to privacy, in unison with control
mechanisms whereby the individual can consent to invasions of
his or her privacy, would afford privacy of medical records the
same status accorded other personal rights protected originally
by the Helsinki Accords and today by the HHS guidelines. As
absolute strictures may prevent and frustrate needed societal
gains, there may be situations where, with appropriate safeguards
proposed by the experimenter and implemented by the IRB,
medical research may proceed without express consent. The
foregoing model is specific enough to provide guidelines yet general enough to be easily and efficiently administered within the
existing medical research framework, thereby accommodating the
conflicting needs of personal privacy and medical science.
213. It should be noted that the success of any new regulatory scheme will
depend in part on the sanctions set out in the regulations. See generally W. WINSLADE,

supra note 185, at 71 (discussing sanctions).
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